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Introduction
1 Background
The main purpose of environmental policy is to correct externalities caused by pro-
duction or consumption. This is done by using appropriate taxes or subsidies or other
methods of regulation. If lump sum transfers were available, that is, if income could be
transferred without any cost from one group of individuals to another, the objective of
a given policy could be reached without redistribution of well-being within the society.
However, typically such transfers are not available. Consequently, it is not possible
to separate the objective of environmental policy and the redistributional eﬀects of
actions taken to achieve it. In this situation, groups that are severely aﬀected by
environmental policy may seek to increase their welfare not only by influencing pure
redistribution itself, but also by pushing the objective of environmental policy to their
favor. In order to understand what objectives can be achieved, given the rules of the
decision making process and the policy instruments available, it is therefore necessary
to take the distributional issues into account.
Nature conservation is a good example of an environmental issue where people have
very diﬀerent preferences over the government’s decisions. Forests, for instance, yield
important private benefits for their owners in terms of timber and related products. In
addition, forest resources provide global public goods in the form of stores for carbon
and biodiversity. They also provide local public goods like benefits from reduced erosion,
positive amenity values for local residents, and increased tourism. These private and
public uses of forest resources are usually in conflict. Thus, if the forest owner is
not compensated for the external benefits created by the forestry, the level of the
public services provided by the forests may remain too low. The aim of a government
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intervention in the form of forest policy is to create a balance between these diﬀerent
objectives. Typically people are heterogenous in that not all own forests or shares of
timber using firms, and not all use forests for recreation. The resulting divergence of
preferences is seen as political debates on what is the ‘correct’ objective of forest policy.
The relevant conflict of interests may also exist at the international level. This is
self-evident when one considers, for instance, pollutants that the wind carries across
national borders. However, the conflict of interests may be equally present when the
link between the well-being of individuals in diﬀerent countries or jurisdictions exists
through the markets. An often expressed concern is that, in the hope to attract capital
and jobs, national governments will relax environmental standards. A regulatory com-
petition between the governments could then lead to national environmental policies
being distorted in favor of the domestic producers, a phenomenon often referred to as
environmental or ecological dumping.
This concern has become more widespread because of the intensified interdepen-
dence of national economies and the rapid increase in the number and importance of
multinational firms. Multinational enterprises have production facilities in more than
one country and are thus seen to be in a more favorable position than national firms
because they can react more eﬃciently to changes in national policy making. When
faced with tightening emission taxation, multinational firms, unlike national firms, are
able to shift production from one country to another so as to escape higher tax rates.
The emergence of multinational production not only shapes national policy design
but also depends on the international institutional setting and national policies. For
instance, during the last few decades, international free trade agreements have reduced
the possibility of individual governments to use direct trade policy measures like import
tariﬀs and barriers to investment. This tendency may have a direct impact on multi-
national production. In addition, restrictions in one area of policy design are likely to
aﬀect policy making in other areas, like in the field of environmental policy that has
largely remained at the discretion of national governments. To the extent that this kind
of changes in the international regime cause shifts in environmental policies, they may
also change the optimal strategies of polluting firms.
In my thesis, I analyze in detail the issues discussed above. In all the cases, the
welfare distributing eﬀects of environmental policy are taken into account and the
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agents may take actions to influence policy making. The main question of interest is
how the policy outcome is shaped by the interaction of agents and how it depends on
the prevailing institutional setting. By comparing the outcome to policies that are, in
some sense, socially optimal, one can then also identify the sources of ineﬃciencies in
actual policy making.
In the first essay of the thesis, I study the formation of forest conservation policy
in a situation where a conflict of interests exists between the wood processing industry,
environmentalists, and consumers. In the second and third essay, the main conflict
of interests is at the international level. The second essay studies the implications
of regulatory competition between national governments on national environmental
policies when polluting firms are multinational. The third essay, in turn, examines the
influence of international free trade agreements on the attractiveness of multinational
production when environmental policy is at the discretion of national governments.
The second section of this introductory essay presents the main findings of the
literature relevant to this thesis. The third section summarizes the three essays of the
thesis.
2 Related Literature
This section surveys the relevant literature and locates my research problems in that
context. The section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection focuses on the
literature on special interest politics with an emphasis on the design of environmental
policy and the second on the literature on environmental policy in international setting.
2.1 Special Interest Politics
Successful lobbying is a public good from the point of view of any politically active
group. Based on this observation Olson argued in his famous book “The Logic of
Collective Action” (1965) that small groups and groups that are able to provide private
benefits to their members are most successful in influencing policy making. The first
attempt to approach the issue of why environmental policy would reflect the interests
of some well-specified groups in the society can be attributed to the public choice
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theorists Buchanan and Tullock (1975). They claimed that the so-called command-
and-control instruments are widely used because they are preferred by the polluting
firms. Buchanan and Tullock considered two alternative ways to restrict emissions,
namely a unit tax on output and an equal output reduction on all existing firms.
Their argument was that the firms prefer output restrictions to taxes because a tax
imposes short-run losses to the firms whereas an output restriction may yield cartel-
like gains because it eﬀectively grandfathers pollution rights to existing firms. Their
paper stimulated an extensive literature seeking to determine in what way polluting
firms are aﬀected by diﬀerent instruments of environmental policy. See e.g. Yohe
(1976), Maloney and McCormick (1982), Dewees (1983), and Hahn (1990). Leidy and
Hoekman (1994) extend the analysis of Buchanan and Tullock to an open economy
with trade barriers and consider explicitly also the interests of environmentalists and
labor groups. Following the work of Buchanan and Tullock, the prominent question
was why polluting industry should prefer one type of regulation over another, and in
particular, why it should prefer ineﬃcient methods of regulation. See e.g. Coate and
Morris (1995) and references therein.
A diﬀerent question is how exactly this preference would translate into political
influence. At least since the influential book “The Economic Analysis of Democracy”
(1957) by Downs, the answer has often been based on the following ideas: First, voters
are generally poorly informed about the characteristics of politicians and their actions.
In the words of Downs, voters remain rationally ignorant as information collection
is costly and the possible influence of each individual voter on the outcome of a large
election is negligible. Second, politicians care for re-election. Since the voters are poorly
informed, the candidates for political oﬃce need to spend resources in order to convince
the voters of their abilities. This gives rise to a situation where interest groups working
on a specific policy issue are able to influence policies either by influencing policy making
directly or by trying to ensure that the ‘right’ candidate is elected to oﬃce.
Two approaches focusing on these diﬀerent aspects of lobbying have been taken in
the literature.1 The first approach concentrates on elections and studies the electoral
competition between candidates or parties in the presence of campaign contributions
1For recent work combining these two approaches, see e.g. Aidt and Dutta (2001), Besley and
Coate (2001) and Grossman and Helpman (1996).
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from interest groups. The interest groups have two motives for giving campaign contri-
butions. First, they may give contributions in order to induce the candidate or party
to choose a more favorable policy position. Second, they may seek to influence the
electoral success of their favorite candidate. Typically, the behavior of voters is not
explicitly modelled, but the voters provide a link between the political campaign and
the expected electoral success.2 Each candidate chooses his policy position so as to
maximize the campaign contributions and thus the probability of winning. This ap-
proach could be seen as a formalization of Downs’ idea that “parties formulate policies
in order to win elections rather than win elections in order to formulate policies”. See
e.g. Hillman and Ursprung (1994) for an application to trade policy where two parties
compete in an election and receive contributions from environmentalists and domestic
as well as foreign industry.
The other approach is to abstract from the election competition and analyze the
policy decisions of an incumbent government under the influence of lobbying. The
origins of this approach can be traced back to important papers by Stigler (1971)
and Peltzman (1976). One central ingredient of this approach has been the notion of
regulatory capture reflecting the idea that concentrated special interests can influence
policies to such a large extent that policy making can be seen as captured by them.
Some studies concentrate on the competition between interest groups and interpret
politicians as taking actions solely determined by the pressure of the interest groups.
See e.g. Becker (1983). Others, in turn, focus more on the decision making process of
the incumbent. For an application to environmental policy, see e.g. Rauscher (1997) who
analyzes equilibrium policies when the government has a rich set instruments available.
For a survey see e.g. Mueller (1989, 1997) or Persson (1998).
Traditionally this approach has been based on the use of political support func-
tions where the welfare of diﬀerent groups have an exogenous weight. The approach
was given rigorous microfoundations by Grossman and Helpman in their famous paper
“Protection for Sale” (1994) in which they analyzed endogenous determination of trade
policy by using a common agency framework introduced by Bernheim and Whinston
2In addition to giving campaign contributions, some groups may also be powerful as voters. See
e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) who show that parties want to
target redistribution to groups that have many mobile voters.
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(1986). In the latter part of the 1990’s the common agency framework was used to an-
alyze various aspects of government policies. For applications to environmental policy,
see Fredriksson (1997), Aidt (1998), and Schleich (1999). Fredriksson (1997) studies
how pollution taxation is determined in a small open economy with a competitive pol-
luting industry when both environmentalists and industrialists seek to influence the
policy. Aidt (1998) considers a small open economy with several polluting production
sectors. Part of the sectors are politically organized, and the government may use both
production and input taxes and subsidies. In these papers, consumer prices of the reg-
ulated industries are determined by the world market price and the industry thus faces
completely elastic demand. In that setting consumers do not face a trade-oﬀ between
better environmental quality and lower price of consumption. Schleich (1999), in turn,
analyzes the determination of both trade and environmental policy in a small open
economy with consumption and production externalities.3
The first essay of my thesis extends this literature by applying the common agency
framework to a new question, namely the formation of forest policies. The essay studies
how the aims of wood processing industry and environmentalists are reflected in the
formation of forest conservation policy, when the government conservation policy takes
the form of restricting timber harvesting in areas that are particularly valuable for
nontimber services of forests.
2.2 Environmental Policy in an International Setting
As mentioned above, the conflict of interests that exists between diﬀerent groups of
individuals in a given society may also be present at a federal or international level.
Sandler (1997) provides an interesting discussion on how the conflict of interests at
the international level and the political concerns within a single country influence the
international development towards limiting acid rain. In particular, Sandler asks why in
North America and in Europe progress has been made towards limiting sulfur emissions
but not nitrogen oxide emissions. His answer has two ingredients. First, the sulfur
emitters include large public utilities that are easier to control for politicians interested
in re-election than, for instance, the use of private vehicles responsible for a large
3See also Dijkstra (2002).
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fraction of nitrogen oxide emissions. Second, on average sulfur emissions travel shorter
distances than nitrogen oxide emissions. This implies that the benefits of a unilateral
action for an individual government are higher.
When considering the international aspect of pollution control, one important ques-
tion has been whether and why non-cooperative policy design by national governments
leads to ineﬃciencies. A related question is then what is the appropriate level of deci-
sion making, that is, should decisions on environmental policy be taken on a national
or international level. As in the literature of capital or income taxation or provision of
local public goods, these questions have recently received much attention as a result of
the increased interdependence of national economies.
Early theoretical studies linking environmental policy and international competi-
tion focus on the eﬀects of stringent environmental regulation on the competitiveness
of domestic industries, see e.g. Pethig (1975), Siebert (1977), and McGuire (1982).
These early studies have been followed by substantial literature studying how policy
design may be influenced if the national governments indeed take into account the
interest of domestic industries. It has been shown that under certain conditions non-
cooperative policy design by national governments leads to a globally eﬃcient outcome.
This happens if polluting firms are competitive, emissions generated by production
are not transboundary, and countries are small. See e.g. Oates and Schwab (1988),
Rauscher (1994), Levinson (1997), and Ulph (1997).
As is often noted, however, big polluters tend to be firms operating in relatively
concentrated industries, like chemical or automobile industries, where the firms are
not necessarily price takers. This may have an impact on the design of environmental
policies, even if the countries in question are small and emissions generated by the
industry are local.4 In a framework of strategic trade policy introduced by Brander and
Spencer (1985), Barrett (1994) and Ulph (1996) show that national governments set
emission standards that lead to marginal cost of abatement being lower than marginal
damage caused by emissions. In a similar setting, Conrad (1993) and Kennedy (1994)
show that non-cooperative emission tax rates are lower than the tax rates that would
prevail if the national governments coordinated their policies so as to maximize joint
4See e.g. Buchanan (1969) and Barnett (1980) on the design of environmental policy in a closed
economy when polluters have market power.
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welfare of the countries. These results seem to support the often expressed concern
that in the absence of direct trade policy measures, national environmental policies are
distorted in favor of domestic producers competing in international markets. Walz and
Wellisch (1997) and Tanguay (2001) in turn consider both trade and environmental
policy and analyze whether, given the tendency for environmental dumping, a trade
agreement that prohibits the use of trade policy increases welfare.
The analyses mentioned above concentrate on a situation where the polluting firms
are national and immobile, and thus the possibility that more stringent environmental
regulation would lead to production fleeing abroad is not an issue. The second essay
of my thesis extends this literature by analyzing the implications of a regulatory com-
petition between governments on environmental policies when the regulated firms are
multinational. The aim is to identify how exactly the governments behave diﬀerently
when the polluting firms are multinational as opposed to being national.
The second essay abstracts entirely from the location decision of the polluting firms.
Typically the location of production can be expected to be influenced by several factors.
Horstman andMarkusen (1992) and Brainard (1997) show that horizontal multinational
firms, that is, firms that have production plants in several countries, tend to exist in
industries with high transportation and firm-level fixed costs and low plant-level fixed
costs. Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) study heterogenous countries and further
show that horizontal multinational production occurs between countries that are similar
in size as well as in relative factor endowment. For a survey of this literature, see e.g.
Markusen (1995, 1998). Some recent papers study endogenous industry structures in
a setting where both horizontal and vertical multinational firms may emerge. Vertical
multinational production will emerge especially in situations where countries under
study have very diﬀerent relative factor endowments and trade costs, including tariﬀs
and other methods of protectionism, are low. See e.g. Markusen and Maskus (2001a,
2001b).
Empirical literature on how stringent environmental regulation may aﬀect the loca-
tion of polluting industries is abundant but the evidence remains mixed. Most studies
reject the so-called pollution haven hypothesis which states that polluting industries
leave countries with stringent environmental regulation and move to countries with
lax or non-existent environmental regulation. See e.g. Tobey (1990), Grossman and
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Krueger (1993), Jaﬀe et al. (1995), and Levinson (1996). Some recent studies in turn
suggest that this phenomenon exists, see e.g. List and Co (2000), and Antweiler et al.
(2001). List and Co (2000) study the eﬀect of heterogenous environmental regulations
in the US states for plant location decisions of foreign multinational firms, and conclude
that stringent environmental regulation and attractiveness of location are inversely re-
lated. Antweiler et al. (2001) study the eﬀect of reduced trade costs on the location
of polluting activities and show that the factor endowment motivation and the pollu-
tion haven motivation for the location of polluting production tend to work to opposite
directions and may balance one another.
The theoretical literature analyzing policy design under a possible threat of reloca-
tion can be divided into studies that focus on the decisions of single-plant firms and into
those that focus on multinational production. Motta and Thisse (1994) consider the
location decision of single-plant firms in a situation where the firms are already located
in one country when environmental regulation is imposed. While Motta and Thisse
consider unilateral policy choices of one government, Rauscher (1995) and Hoel (1997)
study the eﬃciency of national policy design in a situation where governments make
decisions on environmental policy in a non-cooperative manner. The governments first
commit to policies and the firms then decide where to locate. Greaker (2002) consid-
ers a similar situation in the framework of strategic trade policy. Ulph and Valentini
(2001) in turn compare the degree of environmental dumping and welfare when 1) gov-
ernments first commit to policies and firms then choose locations and 2) governments
choose policies after firms have chosen locations. Dijkstra (2003) also studies policy
design with and without commitment but in a setting of a single firm and quantity
restrictions instead of taxation.
Multinational production may arise in Markusen et al. (1995). There, a single firm
must decide whether to set up a production plant in two countries or in one country
only. The trade-oﬀ for the firm is between transportation costs and plant-level fixed
costs. Markusen et al. also analyze environmental policy design in two cases: 1) the firm
first chooses the location of production and the governments then choose policies and
2) governments commit to policies before location choice is made. They then compare
welfare and pollution levels in the two countries in these two cases. Markusen (1997) in
turn considers two national firms and studies how their decision to remain national or
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become multinational is aﬀected by strict environmental regulation, but does not study
policy design.
This literature reveals important insights about the behavior of governments when
threatened by relocation of production and the behavior of polluting firms in the face
of stricter environmental regulation. The aim of the third essay of my dissertation is to
consider the role of environmental policy for multinational production from a diﬀerent
perspective. The starting point of the essay is the observation that there has been in-
creasing pressure towards trade liberalization through international agreements, while
environmental policy has largely remained at the discretion of national governments.
I study how this change in the international regime may influence multinational pro-
duction and focus on the indirect eﬀects of this change through potential shifts in the
design of national environmental policies.
3 Contents of the Dissertation
In this section I present in more detail the main research problems of the essays, discuss
how the problems are analyzed, and present the main results.
3.1 Essay I: Forest Conservation - Too Much or Too Little?
In the first essay of my thesis, I analyze the design of government forest policies under
interest group influence. The main question of interest is under what conditions and
in what way lobbying can be expected to cause observed policies to be distorted from
socially optimal policies. To analyze the incentives of diﬀerent groups to use resources
to influence the design of forest policy, I consider a specific policy issue, namely the
conservation of forests by way of restricting harvesting. If conservation increases the
cost of harvesting for the forest owner, it may also increase the cost of production for
the wood processing industry. However, at the same time, it guarantees that part of
the forest resources is used for other uses than timber production.
This kind of situation can be conveniently analyzed using the common agency frame-
work, where the government is the common agent taking decisions on conservation, and
diﬀerent groups in the society seek to influence government decisions. I focus on a sit-
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uation where the wood processing industry owns the forests subject to conservation.
Thus, the main groups aﬀected by conservation are an environmental group and an
industrial group.
Wood processing industries are often highly concentrated. I therefore consider an
industrial lobby that represents a non-competitive wood processing industry which is
modelled as a monopoly. In this respect, the model diﬀers from the previous com-
mon agency literature. Furthermore, in countries where the wood processing industry
is important for the whole economy, changes in the price of timber may have repercus-
sions to several sectors of the economy. I aim to capture this feature by considering
a situation where imports are not a perfect substitute for domestic production of the
wood processing industry. This enables me to study how the costs of conservation are
distributed between producers and consumers and how the market power of the wood
processing industry influences forest policy.
I study policy design in two diﬀerent cases, namely when the wood product is
exported and when the production of the wood processing industry is destined for
domestic markets. These two scenarios are considered in order to isolate the eﬀect of
a higher consumer price on lobbying and the government forest policy. Under both
scenarios, the socially optimal conservation level that maximizes the aggregate welfare
is solved as a benchmark against which the eﬀects of lobbying are evaluated.
The main findings of the essay are the following. First, comparison of the political
equilibria shows that an exporting monopoly faces a stricter conservation policy than
a monopoly whose production is destined for the domestic market. This is because
when the wood product is exported, part of the costs of conservation are borne by
foreign consumers. Second, when the industrial lobby is more eﬃcient in lobbying than
the environmental lobby, conservation policy in the political equilibrium is insuﬃcient
compared to the socially optimal conservation level. But conservation may be insuf-
ficient from the social point of view even if the environmental lobby is more eﬃcient
than the industrial lobby. This is likely to happen if the group of the politically passive
consumers is large.
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3.2 Essay II: Emission Tax Competition in the Presence of
Multinational Firms
The design of national environmental policy in the presence of multinational firms is the
topic of the second essay of my dissertation. The main questions to be addressed are:
How does the emergence of multinational firms change the incentives of national gov-
ernments for environmental regulation? Would coordination of environmental policies
imply more lax or more severe regulation when firms are multinational?
I construct a model of two countries and two polluting firms. The two firms com-
pete in a Cournot manner in the two markets and are said to be multinational if they
have production plants in both countries. Emissions generated by the production of
the firms cause local environmental problems that each government controls by levying
an emission tax on the polluting firms. The governments are constrained to use only
environmental policy and choose their emission tax policies non-cooperatively so as to
maximize the domestic aggregate welfare, taking into account how the polluting firms
react to policy changes. In order to determine the sources of the potential ineﬃciencies
in national policy design, I also analyze a situation where the two governments coordi-
nate their policies and choose taxation so as to maximize the joint welfare in the two
countries. I start by analyzing the incentives for emission taxation when the polluting
firms are national and can serve the foreign market by exports. This problem has been
previously addressed in the literature, but is presented here in order to allow a clear
comparison to the case of multinational firms.
The analysis confirms the previous results that emission tax competition leads to
too lax environmental policy when the polluting firms are national. This happens for
the reason that is often expressed in the public discussion on environmental dumping:
each government has an incentive to use environmental policy to increase the market
share of domestic producers and thereby profits for domestic shareholders. Relaxing
emission taxation increases profits for the domestic firm but also increases the negative
welfare eﬀects of pollution. When considering a unilateral reduction in tax rate from
the cooperative level, the positive eﬀect of higher profits dominates the negative eﬀect
of increased pollution.
The main contribution of the second essay is to show that this reasoning does not
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carry over to the situation where the polluting firms are multinational. Quite the con-
trary: When polluting firms are multinational non-cooperative emission taxation is
too severe. The reason is that the incentives of national governments for environmen-
tal regulation change in two ways when firms are multinational as opposed to being
national. First, when one government tightens emission taxation, both multinational
firms reduce output in that country and shift production to the other country while
cutting back supply in both markets. As multinational firms react in the same way to
any policy change, changes in environmental policy do not influence the market share
of the domestic firm. Environmental policy is thus not useful in shifting rents to the
domestic shareholders. Second, when polluting firms are multinational, in each country
there is a production plant that may be largely or entirely in foreign ownership. When
setting policies, national governments ignore profits that accrue to foreign shareholders
of these plants and are inclined to set too severe emission taxation.
3.3 Essay III: International Trade Agreements, Environmental
Policy, and Emergence of Multinational Firms
One important factor influencing the degree of multinational production is government
policies, obvious examples being import tariﬀs and investment barriers. Another exam-
ple that has received a lot of attention in recent years is the potential eﬀect of national
environmental regulation. The role of environmental policy has been studied in a set-
ting where strict environmental regulation increases the production costs of polluting
firms and relocation of production may occur as the firms seek to move production to
locations with lower production costs.
The third essay of my dissertation considers the role of environmental policy for
multinational production from a diﬀerent perspective. In the essay, I study how in-
ternational trade agreements may influence multinational production. The aim of the
essay is not to study the direct eﬀects of, for instance, the reduction of trade and invest-
ment barriers, which have received a lot of attention in the literature. Instead, I consider
a trade agreement that prevents the use of export subsidies for domestic producers and
focus on the indirect eﬀects of the agreement on the attractiveness of multinational
production through changes in the design of national environmental policy. The main
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questions of interest are the following: How does national policy design influence firms’
incentives to invest in production capacity in a foreign country? How does the change
in the international institutional regime aﬀect the role of policy design?
In order to address these questions, I consider a situation of two countries and two
polluting firms. Initially each firm is established in one country, has two production
plants, and sells its product to a third market. The two firms may invest abroad by
closing one plant in their home country and opening a new plant abroad. I analyze
the incentives of the firms to do that under two diﬀerent regimes. Under the first
regime, national governments may use export subsidies and emission taxation. Under
the second regime, a trade agreement prohibits the use of export subsidies. When using
environmental policy, the national governments are constrained to set a uniform tax
rate on all polluting plants within their territory.5
The main result of the essay is that a change in the international regime that
restricts the instrument set available to the national governments may increase the
attractiveness of multinational production. The reason is the following: When the
governments cannot use export subsidies and the firms are national, governments use
environmental policy not only to correct the negative externality caused by production
but also to shift profits to the domestic shareholders. In this situation, foreign owned
plants not only eliminate the possibility to use environmental policy to shift profits to
the domestic shareholders but also create an incentive to tax profits accruing to foreign
shareholders. In contrast, when the governments can use both environmental and trade
policy, an investment abroad does not have similar strategic eﬀects.
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Essay I
Forest Conservation - Too Much or Too Little?
A Political Economy Model
Abstract
This paper studies the formation of forest policy when the government is
influenced by an environmental lobby and an industrial lobby representing a non-
competitive wood processing industry. Government decides on forest conserva-
tion by way of restricting timber harvesting. Lobbying is modelled as a common
agency game with diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of lobbying. A comparison of the
political equilibria shows that an exporting forest industry faces a stricter con-
servation requirement than a forest industry whose production is destined for the
domestic markets. If the industrial lobby is more eﬃcient than the environmental
lobby, conservation is insuﬃcient from the social point of view. However, con-
servation may be insuﬃcient even if the environmental lobby is more eﬃcient in
lobbying than the industrial lobby. This is likely to happen when the group of
consumers that remain politically passive is large.
Keywords: Amenity valuation, common agency, forest policy, lobbying, market
power
JEL Classification: D72, Q23
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1 Introduction
Forest resources are used to produce timber, but they also provide many kinds of
amenities. Timber and related wood products are private goods whereas other services
provided by the forests are to a large extent public. If the forest owner is not com-
pensated for the external benefits created by the forestry, the level of socially valuable
public services of the forests may remain too low.1
Government forest policies aim to create a balance between these diﬀerent uses of
forest resources. Typically people are not aﬀected in the same way by the government’s
decisions, and therefore, the trade-oﬀ between the diﬀerent uses of forest resources
creates political tensions. Groups that often participate in the public debate on the
‘correct’ objective of forest policy include environmentalists, the wood processing in-
dustry, and the forest owners.2
Despite the debates concerning government forest policies, the formation of forest
policy has not been previously analyzed in the political economy literature. How the
aims of diﬀerent groups within the society are reflected in the formation of forest pol-
icy is the topic of this paper. The main question of interest is under what conditions
and how the influence of special interests can be expected to cause observed policies
to be distorted from socially optimal policies. In order to study this question, we con-
sider a specific policy issue, namely conservation of forests by way of restricting timber
harvesting in areas that are particularly valuable for non-timber services of forests. If
conservation makes harvesting more costly for the forest owner, it may also increase
the cost of timber for the wood processing industry. At the same time, conservation
guarantees that part of the forest resources is used for recreational and environmental
purposes. For simplicity, we consider a situation where the wood processing industry
owns the forests subject to conservation. Clearly, in this situation the forest industry
and environmental groups have diﬀerent preferences over the government’s decisions
and may seek to influence policy making in order to enhance their welfare.
We will analyze the situation illustrated above using the common agency model
introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). In the political context this model was
1See e.g. Koskela and Ollikainen (1999).
2For a discussion on forestry conflicts see, e.g. Palo and Uusivuori (1999) and references therein.
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first used by Grossman and Helpman (1994) to analyze endogenous trade policy, and it
has since then become a standard model to analyze government policies under interest
group influence.3
One of the characteristics of wood processing industries is often a concentrated
market structure.4 Furthermore, in countries where the wood processing industry is
important for the whole economy, changes in the price of timber may have repercussions
to several sectors of the economy. As a result, forest conservation decisions aﬀect
not only the welfare of the groups that actively participate in the debate on forest
conservation, but the welfare of all consumers. Finally, an industrial lobby representing
a concentrated wood processing industry and an environmental lobby typically have
distinct methods of lobbying and diﬀerent channels of influence.
We aim to capture the features mentioned above in the following way. First, we
will consider an industrial lobby that represents a non-competitive industry, which we
for simplicity model as a monopoly. Second, imports will not be a perfect substitute
for domestic production of the wood processing industry. These aspects of the model
imply that forest conservation influences the welfare of all consumers through changes
in consumer price. They therefore enable us to study how the costs of conservation are
distributed between producers and consumers and how the market power of the wood
processing industry influences the political determination of forest conservation. In
order to isolate the welfare-eﬀects of forest conservation through the consumer price, we
study policy design in two diﬀerent situations, in a situation where the wood processing
industry exports its final product and a situation where its production is destined for
domestic markets. Third, we allow for asymmetry between the two lobbies in that they
need not be equally eﬃcient in lobbying. This implies that even if the lobbies were to
use a same amount of total resources in order to influence policy making, one of the
lobbies may be more successful in its eﬀort than the other.
Previous applications of the common agency model to environmental policy design
concentrate on environmental and trade policies in small open economies in a setting
where firms are competitive and imports are a perfect substitute to domestic production.
3For an illuminating discussion on the research of special interest politics, see e.g. Persson and
Tabellini (2000). Hillman and Ursprung (1991) and Austen-Smith (1997) survey earlier literature.
4See e.g. Koskela and Ollikainen (1998) and Bergman and Brännlund (1995).
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Fredriksson (1997) considers a small open economy with a non-polluting and a polluting
production sector. The government uses a production tax to regulate pollution, and the
owners of a fixed factor used in the polluting sector and an environmental lobby seek to
influence the policy choices. Aidt (1998) considers a small open economy with several
production sectors some of which are represented by a lobby. All sectors use polluting
raw materials in production. Aidt shows that while a benevolent social planner would
use only a tax on the raw material, in the political equilibrium the government uses a
tax on the raw material as well as output taxes and subsidies. Production sectors that
are represented by a lobby receive an output subsidy while the unorganized production
sectors pay a tax. Also in Schleich (1999) some of the several production sectors are
represented by a lobby. Only one sector is polluting, but the government may use trade
and production policies in all sectors in order to correct the externality and satisfy
the industry lobbies. Schleich shows that in the case of production externality the
government will use only production policies. The production tax for the polluting
sector will be lower than the socially optimal Pigouvian tax rate, if it is organized,
and higher, if it is unorganized. Moreover, the organized non-polluting sectors get a
production subsidy while the unorganized sectors pay a production tax.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the economy
and characterize the socially optimal conservation policy. In section 3, we present the
political process. In section 4, we analyze the determinants of the political equilibrium
and study how it compares to the social optimum. Section 5 oﬀers some concluding
comments.
2 The Economy
2.1 Production
The economy has two production sectors. The first sector is characterized by competi-
tive firms producing a tradable numeraire good, z, with linear technology and labor, n,
as the only factor of production. All consumers own one unit of labor which they sup-
ply to either of the production sectors. Consumers earn wage, w, in both sectors. We
assume that the supply of labor is large enough for the numeraire good to be produced.
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The other production sector consists of a monopoly that produces a wood product,
y, with timber, k, and labor with constant returns to scale technology, y = f (k, n).
The monopoly may use timber from its own forests or import timber for production
from abroad. By exporting timber the monopoly earns the world market price for round
wood, q, which thus constitutes the opportunity cost of using timber in production. The
cost of importing round wood for production is q+τ , where τ represents transportation
costs.
As our focus is on the political process, we want to model the economy in the simplest
possible way. Therefore, we abstract from the intertemporal aspects of forestry and
consider steady-state annual yields. In each period, the monopoly harvests this yield,
or part of it, depending on the (deterministic) world market price for round wood.
Conservation reduces forest areas available for commercial harvesting, creating a
binding constraint on cuttings. Conservation decisions therefore include both a decision
on what the level of conservation should be and a decision on which particular areas are
chosen for conservation. Here, we will concentrate on the decision of the conservation
level. The level of conservation is defined to be
m = K − k,
where K is the steady-state annual yield and k is the amount of timber that may be
harvested. Conservation level m = K would then imply a complete preservation policy
and conservation level m = 0 would imply a market solution.
We will analyze two diﬀerent situations: a situation where the wood product is
consumed domestically and a situation where it is exported.5 The resource constraint
of this economy is
Y = C +X −M ,
where Y is national income, C consumption, and X and M the value of exports and
imports, respectively. Imports consist of imported numeraire good, zM , and round
wood, kM , i.e.
M = zM + kM (q + τ ) .
5In order to clearly identify the eﬀects of forest conservation on consumer surplus, we concentrate
on the situation where the domestic production is not competing with imports.
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When the wood product is exported, exports consist of the wood product, y, the nu-
meraire good, zX , and round wood, kX , i.e.
X = p (y) y + zX + kXq,
where p (y) is the demand schedule faced by the wood processing industry abroad.
Clearly, conservation may be so extensive that importing timber is profitable for
the monopoly. If timber for production were imported, changes in conservation policy
would have no eﬀect on production costs nor the consumer price. We will therefore
focus on a situation where kM = 0. In that case, kX = k − k, where k is the amount
of timber used in own production. National income without the benefits from forest
conservation can then be written as
Y = z + p (y) y +
¡
k − k
¢
q,
and it consists of domestic production of the numeraire good and the value of the wood
product and the exported round wood.
Given that the monopoly does not import round wood for production, it maximizes
profits given by
p(y)f (k, n) +
¡
k − k
¢
q − wn (1)
subject to the constraint that k ≥ k.
The total cost of timber use consists of the opportunity cost of timber and the
shadow price of harvesting. This shadow price is strictly positive when all timber
harvested is used for own production, that is, when k = k. In that case tightening the
harvesting constraint increases the cost of timber use. (See Appendix A for details.)
Let q (m) denote the total cost of timber use as a function of the conservation level.
From the definition of the conservation level it then follows that q0 (m) > 0.6 Thus the
marginal eﬀect of conservation on the unit cost of production is
cm (q (m) , w) = cq (q (m) , w) q
0 (m) > 0.
6Partial derivatives are denoted by ∂Ω∂x , by Ωx, or, in the case of functions of a single variable, by
primes.
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An increase in conservation raises the cost of production as the monopoly needs to
substitute labor for timber if it wishes to maintain a given level of production.
The above discussion implies that when analyzing the incentives to use resources
in lobbying, of particular interest is the situation where the constraint on harvesting
is such that all timber harvested is used for own production and conservation is not
extensive enough to induce imports. In this situation changes in conservation policy
influence the cost of production and the price of consumption.
2.2 Consumers
The economy consists of three kinds of consumers. The overall size of the population is
normalized to one. Fraction α of the population owns the timber using monopoly and
earns monopoly profits. In the political process consumers belonging to this group form
the industrial lobby. Fraction β of the consumers belong to the environmental lobby.7
These groups are assumed to be disjoint. Fraction (1− α− β) of the consumers belongs
to neither of the above mentioned groups and remains passive in the political process.
Consumers belonging to lobby i contribute to their group’s objective by providing
their share of the total resources, Ti (m), used by the lobby. In this setting, it is natural
to think of the environmental lobby as a legitimate, national environmental organization
that participates to the formation of government policies. From the point of view of
an individual that belongs to the environmental organization, the contribution could
be interpreted as a membership fee.8 Net income of consumers in diﬀerent groups are
7As only two groups participate to the political process, it is conceivable that they could reach
an agreement on the appropriate level of conservation through negotiation. Since typically the most
visible way of influencing conservation decisions is the direct influence on government decision making,
we concentrate on that situation.
8It is conceivable that a monopoly lobby is able to control free riding of its members fairly eﬃciently.
The same may not be true for large environmental organizations. See Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), and
Peltzman (1976) for seminal contributions on this issue. For endogenous formation of lobby groups in
the common agency setting, see Mitra (1999).
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then
Iα = w +
1
απ(p, q(m), w)−
1
αTα(m),
Iβ = w −
1
βTβ(m), and
I1−α−β = w.
When there exists a domestic market for the wood product, the utility maximizing
demands for the wood product and the numeraire good are derived as solutions to the
following optimization problems:
max
z,y
{z + u(y) + g(m)} s.t. Ii = z + py for i = α,β, 1− α− β,
where u (y) is utility from consumption of the wood product, g(m) is utility from
conservation, and p is the price of the wood product.9 All members of the society
benefit equally from conservation. This assumption highlights the idea that the most
important nontimber services of forests are pure public goods, like forests as a stock for
carbon or for biodiversity.10
Since the utility function is quasi-linear, the demand of the wood product depends
only on its own price and can be expressed as y = d(p). The demand of the numeraire
good is then
zi(p) = Ii − pd(p) for i = α,β, 1− α− β,
where Ii is the net income of a consumer in group i. Given d (p) and zi(p), the policy
preferences of the consumers in diﬀerent groups can be represented by the following
9As usual, u0 > 0, u00 < 0, g0 > 0, and g00 < 0. Both u (y) and g (m) satisfy Inada conditions.
10An alternative assumption would be that only consumers belonging to the environmental lobby
benefit from conservation, for instance, because they value the recreational opportunities created by
forests.
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indirect utility functions:
Vα (m) = w + cs (m) + g (m) +
1
απ(p, q(m), w)−
1
αTα(m)
=
1
α [φα(m)− Tα(m)] ,
Vβ (m) = w + cs (m) + g(m)−
1
βTβ(m) (2)
=
1
β
£
φβ(m)− Tβ(m)
¤
,
V1−α−β (m) = w + cs (m) + g(m)
=
1
1− α− βφ1−α−β(m),
where cs (m) = u(d(p (m)))− p (m) d(p (m)), and the gross welfare of group i is φi(m).
2.3 Socially Optimal Conservation Policy
We now study how conservation influences welfare of the diﬀerent groups in the econ-
omy and characterize the socially optimal conservation policy. Aggregate welfare is
represented by a utilitarian welfare function. We define two diﬀerent welfare measures.
Aggregate gross welfare consists of consumer surplus, monopoly profits, and utility from
conservation. Aggregate net welfare in turn refers to aggregate welfare net of lobbying
costs. When the wood product is consumed domestically, the latter is given by
W d (m) = φd(m)− Tα(m)− Tβ(m),
where
φd (m) = φdα(m) + φdβ(m) + φd1−α−β(m)
= w + cs (m) + g (m) + π (p, q(m), w) (3)
is the aggregate gross welfare and superscript d refers to domestic consumption.
The eﬀects of a change in conservation on the gross welfare of diﬀerent consumer
groups are given by
∂φdα(m)
∂m = πm (p, q(m), w) + α [csm(m) + g
0(m)] , (4)
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∂φdβ(m)
∂m = β [csm(m) + g
0(m)] , (5)
and
∂φd1−α−β(m)
∂m = (1− α− β) [csm(m) + g
0(m)] , (6)
where
csm(m) = −u00 (y (m)) y (m) ym (m) < 0, and
πm (p, q(m), w) = −y (m) cm (q (m) , w) < 0,
and y (m) denotes the profit maximizing output level as a function of the conservation
level.
A stricter conservation policy reduces consumer surplus as it increases the price of
consumption. It also reduces the maximum profits of the wood processing industry.
However, a stricter conservation policy also directly benefits all consumers. There-
fore, the optimal conservation level is strictly positive. Under the assumption that
the second-order condition for welfare maximization is satisfied, the socially optimal
conservation level, md∗, is determined by
∂φd(md∗)
∂m =
∂φdα(md∗)
∂m +
∂φdβ(md∗)
∂m +
∂φd1−α−β(md∗)
∂m = 0. (7)
In the social optimum, the marginal benefit of increased conservation equals the cost
imposed on consumers and monopoly owners in the form of higher consumption price
and lower profits. Equation (7) implies that ∂φ
d
α(m
d∗)
∂m < 0 and
∂φdβ(md∗)
∂m > 0.
When the final product of the wood processing industry is exported, aggregate net
welfare is W e (m) = φe(m)− Tα(m)− Tβ(m), where
φe (m) = φeα(m) + φeβ(m) + φe1−α−β(m)
= w + g (m) + π (p, q(m), w) (8)
is the aggregate gross welfare and the superscript e refers to exported wood product.
In the social optimum
∂φe(me∗)
∂m =
∂φeα(me∗)
∂m +
∂φeβ(me∗)
∂m +
∂φe1−α−β(me∗)
∂m = 0. (9)
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In both cases, in the social optimum, welfare of the members of the environmental
group is increasing inm and welfare of the monopoly owners is decreasing in m. There-
fore, the interests of the two groups are clearly in conflict. This conflict reflects the
nature of forests as a joint production of private goods and amenity values. In analyzing
lobbying, we focus on this conflict. In addition to the eﬀects discussed above, conser-
vation may have other eﬀects on the economy which are not considered here. These
include, for instance, the eﬀect of conservation on the value of forest land. Furthermore,
by analyzing policy design in a static environment, we leave aside potentially interesting
issues concerning, for instance, the asymmetric nature of conservation decisions.
3 The Political Process
We now turn to the determination of conservation policy when environmental and
industrial lobbies influence the decision of the government. The government has two
distinct objectives. It takes into account the aggregate welfare of the consumers but
may also be willing to distort policy in order to receive benefits from the lobbies. The
government maximizes a weighted sum of aggregate welfare and contributions from the
two lobbies
G(m;Cjα, C
j
β) = aφ
j(m) + Cjα(m) + C
j
β(m), (10)
where parameter a is the weight that the government attaches to aggregate welfare of
the consumers, Cji (m) denotes contributions of lobby i contingent on the policy chosen
by the government, and j = d, e. The relative weight of aggregate welfare could be
interpreted as a measure of transparency of the political system.11
The objective of the lobbies is to enhance the welfare of their members by influencing
the level of conservation. Restricting harvesting is an instrument that allows for con-
serving certain forests that are particularly valuable for nontimber services. Harvesting
taxes, for instance, also typically influence the quantity harvested, but they cannot be
targeted to preserve a given area. In addition, using a tax as an instrument to regulate
harvesting would change the nature of the political process. Taxation would generate
11See e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for discussion.
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revenue to be distributed back to the consumers and the existence of this tax rev-
enue would create an additional motive for lobbying. As a result, lobbying would lead
to pure redistribution from the unorganized groups to the organized groups. In fact,
many of the distortions created by lobbying in the previous literature on environmental
regulation with competitive industries stem from this additional motive.12
The contributions of the two lobbies represent the monetary equivalent of all the
resources used to influence the political process. When considering the influence of two
very diﬀerent kind of lobbies, it is natural to allow for diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of
lobbying. We follow Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, Ch. 11) in assuming that using resources
in order to influence the government is costly in the sense that a contribution of one
dollar costs (1 + λi) dollars for lobby i. Therefore, total resources used by lobby i are
Ti (m) = (1 + λi)Ci(m).
Parameter λi is non-negative and reflects the eﬃciency of lobbying. When λα = λβ,
lobbies are equally eﬃcient. In general, λi depends on how the attractiveness of lobbying
is influenced, for instance, by the tax code and direct regulations. In addition, λi is
likely to be high for groups with high fund raising costs or high administrative costs,
which may arise because of large and dispersed membership or because of the need to
spend resources to prevent free riding. Diﬀerences in the cost of lobbying could also
arise because the preferences of the government are more in line with one lobby than
the other.13
Timing of the political game is as follows. Lobbies first choose simultaneously
their contribution schedules which determine their contribution for all possible policy
decisions of the government. The government then chooses the conservation level that
maximizes its payoﬀ.
12For instance, in Fredriksson (1997) environmental policy under lobbying would coincide with the
socially optimal policy, if the tax revenue was returned to the polluting industry instead of being
distributed to all consumers.
13A more complete analysis would then incorporate elections where the identity of the government
is determined, see e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1996). Here, as is typical in the literature, the
transaction cost is exogenous. Genuine incorporation of the features influencing eﬃciency would call
for endogenization of this cost, see e.g. Faure-Grimaud et al. (1999).
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Lemma 2 in Bernheim andWhinston (1986) shows that there exists a set of subgame
perfect equilibria in this game. It can be readily extended to the case where lobbying
is costly.
Lemma 1 When there are strictly positive lobbying costs, policy mj and contribution
schedules Cjα(m) and C
j
β(m) form a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if
1) Cji (m)≥ 0 for i = α, β
2) mj ∈ argmax
©
G(m;Cjα, C
j
β)
ª
,
3) mj ∈ argmax
n
G(m;Cjα, C
j
β) +
1
1+λi
£
φi(m)− (1 + λi)C
j
i (m)
¤o
for i = α,β, and
4) ∃ m−i ∈ argmax
©
G(m;Cjα, C
j
β)
ª
with Cji (m
−i) = 0.
Condition 1 states the assumption that lobbies cannot demand contributions from
the government. Condition 2 states that the government chooses a policy that maxi-
mizes its payoﬀ given the contribution schedules of the lobbies. Condition 3 states that
in equilibrium, the government chooses a policy that maximizes the weighted joint pay-
oﬀ of the government and lobby i, the weight of the lobby depending on its eﬃciency.
A violation of this condition at em would imply that lobby i could induce government
to choose em instead of mj by changing its contribution schedule in such a way that
both lobby i and the government were strictly better oﬀ. Finally, condition 4 states
that there must exist policy m−i that gives the government the same payoﬀ as the
equilibrium policy and induces a zero contribution from lobby i. If not, lobby i could
reduce its equilibrium contribution without inducing the government to deviate from
the equilibrium policy.
As is customary in the political applications of the common agency framework, we
assume that the contribution schedules of the lobbies are truthful. This means that the
change in the contribution induced by a given policy change always correctly reflects
the policy preferences of the lobbies. Conditions of Lemma 1 imply that the equilibrium
policy is implicitly defined by
∂φji (mj)
∂m = (1 + λi)
∂Cji (mj)
∂m for i = α, β, (11)
where j = d, e. Hence, in the equilibrium, the marginal change in total lobbying costs
of lobby i induced by a small change in conservation policy equals the marginal change
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in the welfare of lobby i. The cost of lobbying essentially dampens the eﬀect of a given
policy change on the contribution of lobby i. Thus, when the lobbying cost increases,
the equilibrium contribution of the lobby becomes less responsive to changes in welfare.
Plugging equation (11) into the first-order condition of the government derived from
condition 2 of Lemma 1 gives·
1
(1 + λα)
+ a
¸
∂φjα(mj)
∂m +
·
1
(1 + λβ)
+ a
¸ ∂φjβ(mj)
∂m + a
∂φj1−α−β(mj)
∂m = 0. (12)
Thus, the policy that maximizes the payoﬀ of the government according to condition 2
of Lemma 1 also maximizes
Ωj(m) =
·
1
(1 + λα)
+ a
¸
φjα(m) +
·
1
(1 + λβ)
+ a
¸
φjβ(m) + aφ
j
1−α−β(m). (13)
The above discussion implies that the outcome of lobbying is eﬃcient in the sense
that it maximizes the weighed sum of the payoﬀ of the government and the two active
lobbies.14 However, to the extent that not all consumers who are influenced by conser-
vation decisions engage in lobbying activities, the politically determined conservation
level will be ineﬃcient from the point of view of the society as a whole.
4 Conservation as a Result of the Political Process
In this section, we analyze the relationship of the political equilibrium and the so-
cially optimal conservation level and determine factors that influence the equilibrium
outcome. We first analyze the relationship of the political equilibria when the wood
product is exported and when it is consumed domestically. In addition, we study how
the market power of the wood processing industry influences the political equilibria.
A comparison of the two political equilibria determined by (12) shows that
Proposition 1 When the final product of the wood processing industry is exported,
the politically determined conservation policy is stricter than when the wood product is
destined for domestic consumption.
14For equations (12) to characterize maxima, second-order conditions must hold. Throughout the
analysis of the following section, we will assume that the second-order conditions are satisfied.
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Proof. By using equations (4)-(7) it follows that for j = d
Ωdm (m) =
·
1
1 + λα
+ a
¸
πm (p, q(m), w) + ϕ [csm (m) + g0(m)]
where ϕ =
·
a+ α
(1+λα) +
β
(1+λβ)
¸
. For j = e, equation (12) can be rewritten as
·
1
1 + λα
+ a
¸
πm (p, q(me), w) + ϕg0(me) = 0.
Evaluating Ωdm (m) at m = me then yields Ωdm(me) = ϕcsm (me) < 0.
This result is driven by the eﬀects of conservation on the consumer surplus. As the
wood processing industry is non-competitive, the optimal output is generally lower than
the output that would prevail in a competitive market. A strict conservation policy
further reduces the supply of the wood processing industry. This reduces consumer sur-
plus and aﬀects all the consumers when the wood product is consumed domestically.15
However, when the wood product is exported, the negative eﬀects of conservation are re-
stricted to the owners of the wood processing industry. The costs of forest conservation
are therefore partly borne by foreign consumers.
In order to study the eﬀect of the market power on the politically determined forest
conservation policy, for tractability, we concentrate on a situation where the demand
elasticity is constant. This allows us to use the degree of the demand elasticity as a
measure of the market power of the monopoly. Let yε (m) denote the marginal influence
of a change in the demand elasticity on the profit maximizing output. We then have
that
Lemma 2 When yε (m) > 0 and the wood product is exported, the equilibrium con-
servation level is increasing in the market power of the exporting monopoly. If the
wood product is destined for the domestic market, the eﬀect of market power on the
equilibrium policy is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix B.
15See e.g. Barnett (1980) on the regulation of a polluting monopoly.
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If the optimal output level is increasing in the demand elasticity, the negative eﬀect
of conservation on profit is aggravated by loss of market power. When the wood prod-
uct is exported, the monopoly profit is the only channel through which market power
influences the eﬀect of conservation decisions on aggregate welfare. Consequently, if
the monopoly loses market power, overall social costs of forest conservation increase
while the benefits remain unchanged. Hence, the conservation level is lower when the
domestic wood processing industry loses market power in the export market.
When the product of the wood processing industry is destined for domestic markets,
a change in the demand conditions aﬀects the equilibrium policy through two channels.
In addition to the eﬀect on profits, changes in the market power of the industry influ-
ence the eﬀect of conservation on the consumer surplus. However, this eﬀect remains
ambiguous. Therefore, when the wood product is consumed domestically the influence
of changes in market power on the political equilibrium is ambiguous.
Consider then how the politically determined conservation policy may be distorted
from the social optimum. Here, lobbying may lead the conservation policy to be in-
eﬃcient for three reasons: because the wood processing industry has market power,
because the two lobbies are not equally eﬃcient in lobbying, and because not all who
benefit from forest conservation take part in lobbying.16 The results are summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When the wood product is exported or consumed domestically
i) if the industrial lobby is more eﬃcient than the environmental lobby, the politically
determined conservation level is insuﬃcient from the social point of view.
ii) if the environmental lobby is more eﬃcient than the industrial lobby, depending on
how large the group of politically passive consumers is relative to the group of environ-
mentalists, conservation may be insuﬃcient or excessive. Conservation is more likely
to be insuﬃcient when the group of politically passive consumers is large.
16A fourth possible source ineﬃciency would be the existence of tax revenue as it creates an additional
incentive for lobbying.
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Proof. Solving (7) and (9) for ∂φ
j
α(m)
∂m and plugging into (12) givesµ
1
1 + λα
+ a
¶
∂φj(mj)
∂m +
1
1 + λα
"µ
1− 1 + λα
1 + λβ
¶ ∂φjβ(mj)
∂m +
∂φj1−α−β(mj)
∂m
#
= 0.
Hence, for j = d,
∂φd(md)
∂m =
1
(1 + a (1 + λα))
"
λβ − λα
(1 + λβ)
∂φdβ(md)
∂m +
∂φd1−α−β(md)
∂m
#
=
[(1− α− β) (1 + λβ) + β (λβ − λα)]
£
g0
¡
md
¢
+ csm
¡
md
¢¤
(1 + λβ) (1 + a (1 + λα))
.
In the same manner, for j = e,
∂φe (me)
∂m =
[(1− α− β) (1 + λβ) + β (λβ − λα)] g0 (me)
1 + (1 + λα) a
Since g0
¡
md
¢
+ csm
¡
md
¢
> 0 and g0 (m) > 0, a suﬃcient condition for ∂φ
d(md)
∂m > 0 and
∂φe(me)
∂m > 0 is λα < λβ. A necessary condition for
∂φd(md)
∂m < 0 and
∂φe(me)
∂m < 0 in turn
is that λα − λβ > 1−α−ββ (1 + λβ).
When the wood product is exported, the only group that is adversely aﬀected by
an increase in the conservation level is the monopoly owners. All the other consumers
benefit from stricter conservation policies. When the wood product is consumed do-
mestically, all consumers are influenced by the conservation decisions also through the
consumer price. In both cases, if the industrial lobby is at least as eﬃcient as the envi-
ronmental lobby, the politically determined conservation level is insuﬃcient relative to
the socially optimal conservation level.
However, the conservation level may remain too low even if the environmental lobby
is more eﬃcient than the industrial lobby. This happens especially if the group of
politically passive consumers is large. The reason is that the passive consumers benefit
from the lobbying eﬀort of the environmental lobby, but the objective of the group
is to maximize the welfare of its members only. This means that the environmental
lobby does not take into account the benefits of its lobbying eﬀort for the other groups
in the society. The politically determined conservation will be excessive only if the
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environmental lobby is suﬃciently more eﬃcient than the industrial lobby. This is
likely to be the case if the diﬀerence in lobbying eﬃciencies is substantial relative to
the ratio of the population share of the politically passive consumers and the politically
active environmentalists.
As mentioned earlier, it is conceivable that the industrial lobby is able to control
free riding better than a large environmental group with a disperse membership. Of
course, making lobbying prohibitively expensive for both lobbies would guarantee that
policy design reflects the social optimum. However, without precise knowledge of what
are the most important factors influencing the eﬃciency of lobbying, this policy could
lead to substantial ineﬃciencies. This is an area for future research.
5 Conclusions
This paper has used a political economy approach to analyze the design of forest policy.
More specifically, we have studied how forest conservation policy is determined when the
government is influenced by an industrial and an environmental lobby. Policy formation
has been modelled as a common agency game.
Decisions of the government aﬀect the welfare of consumers in several ways. First,
forest conservation increases the harvesting cost and thereby the cost of production.
Consequently, conservation decisions aﬀect the maximum profits of the wood process-
ing industry. In addition, if the wood product is destined for domestic consumption,
increased conservation requirement aﬀects the welfare of all the domestic consumers
through a higher price of consumption. Finally, conservation benefits all consumers by
guaranteeing a certain level of non-timber services.
Comparison of the political equilibria shows that an exporting monopoly faces a
stricter conservation policy than a monopoly whose production is destined for the do-
mestic market. When the wood product is exported, part of the costs of conservation are
borne by foreign consumers. The more elastic the demand of the wood product abroad,
the more severely the industry is aﬀected by an increased conservation requirement.
Hence, a change in the international environment that causes the domestic industry to
face more elastic demand abroad limits the willingness of the government to engage in
forest conservation.
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When the wood product is exported, conservation decisions influence the profits of
the wood processing industry but aﬀect all consumers only through the benefit derived
from nontimber services of forests. Hence, the environmentalists and the politically
passive consumers always benefit from stricter conservation policies. When the wood
product is destined for the domestic market, all consumers are aﬀected by conservation
also through the higher consumer price. In both cases, when the industrial lobby is more
eﬃcient than the environmental lobby, conservation policy in the political equilibrium
is insuﬃcient compared to the socially optimal conservation level. But conservation
may be insuﬃcient from the social point of view even if the environmental lobby is
more eﬃcient than the industrial lobby. This is likely to happen if the group of the
politically passive consumers is large.
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A Appendix
Lagrangian of the constrained optimization problem of the monopolist is
L (k, n,λ) = p (f (k, n)) f (k, n) +
¡
k − k
¢
q − wn+ λ
¡
k − k
¢
.
Using ε = −df(k,n)
dp(·)
p(·)
f(k,n)
the associated first-order conditions are
Lk (k, n,λ) = 0⇔
µ
1− 1ε
¶
pfk (k, n) = q + λ, (A1)
Ln (k, n,λ) = 0⇔
µ
1− 1ε
¶
pfn (k, n) = w, and (A2)
Lλ (k, n,λ) = 0⇔ k − k = 0. (A3)
Define q = q + λ. The first-order conditions establish a maximum, since the bordered
Hessian matrix
H =


0 −1 0
−1 πkk πkn
0 πnk πnn


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is negative semi-definite. Totally diﬀerentiating (A1)-(A3) with respect to λ and k
yields


∂2L
∂λ2
∂2L
∂λ∂k
∂2L
∂λ∂n
∂2L
∂k∂λ
∂2L
∂k2
∂2L
∂k∂n
∂2L
∂n∂λ
∂2L
∂k∂n
∂2L
∂n2




dλ
dk
dk
dk
dn
dk

 =


−1
0
0

 .
Thus when k = k,
dq
dk
=
dλ
dk
=
− [πkkπnn − πknπnk]
|H| < 0 and
d2q
dk
2 = 0.
B Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. When k − k = 0, the profit function of the monopoly is
π (p, q(m), w) = max
y
{p (y) y − c(q(m), w)y} , (B1)
and hence the optimal output level is determined by
p (y) + p0 (y) y − c(q(m), w) = 0. (B2)
Using p = y−
1
ε where ε = −dy
dp
p
y
gives y (m) =
h
c(q(m),w)
1− 1ε
i−ε
and
ym (m) = −εy (m)
cm(q(m), w)
c(q(m), w)
< 0. (B3)
If ε is constant
yε (m) = y (m)
·
− ln
·
c(q(m), w)
1− 1ε
¸
+
1
ε− 1
¸
= y (m)
·
− ln
h
y (m)−
1
ε
i
+
1
ε− 1
¸
.
When y (m) > 1 the optimal output is increasing in the demand elasticity. Totally
diﬀerentiating first-order condition (12) yields
dmj
dε = −
Ωjmε (mj)
Ωjmm (mj)
,
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where Ωjmm (mj) < 0. For j = e
Ωemε (me) = −
µ
1
1 + λα
+ a
¶
yε (m) cm (q (m
e) , w) .
If yε (m) > 0 it directly follows that Ωemε (me) < 0. As a result, dm
e
dε < 0. For j = d
Ωdmε(md) =
µ
a+
1
1 + λα
¶
πmε
¡
p, q
¡
md
¢
, w
¢
+
µ
a+
α
1 + λα
+
β
1 + λβ
¶
csmε
¡
md
¢
.
Using p = y−
1
ε gives that
csm (m) = −
εcm (q (m) , w)
ε− 1 y (m)
and hence
csmε (m) =
cm (q (m) , w)
(ε− 1)2
y (m)− εcm (q (m) , w)ε− 1 yε (m) .
When yε (m) > 0, the eﬀect of market power on consumer surplus remains ambiguous.
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Essay II
Environmental Tax Competition in the Presence of
Multinational Firms
Abstract
We study the design of environmental policy in a two country model with an
imperfectly competitive polluting industry. We show that while non-cooperative
policy design leads to too lax emission taxation when polluting firms are national,
it leads to too severe taxation when they are multinational. The reason is twofold.
When firms are multinational, environmental policy is not useful in shifting rents
to domestic shareholders. In addition, when designing their policies, national
governments ignore profits accruing to foreign shareholders of multinational firms.
Keywords: Environmental policy, multinational firms, tax competition
JEL Classification: D62, F23, H77
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1 Introduction
Multinational firms play an increasingly important role in international competition. In
1997, the gross product of all multinational firms accounted for roughly one quarter of
the world’s gross product. In addition, global sales of foreign aﬃliates of multinational
firms were twice as high as global exports indicating that to a large extent multinational
firms spread horizontally, that is, exports are at least partially replaced by foreign
production.1
An often expressed concern is that the increasing dominance of multinational firms
will undermine the eﬃciency of national environmental regulation. When faced with
tightening environmental regulation, multinational firms, unlike national firms, are able
to shift production from one country to another so as to escape higher tax rates. The
fear is that this may induce national governments to relax environmental protection in
order to prevent domestic production from fleeing abroad. Despite this concern, the
problem of regulating multinational polluting firms has received little attention in the
economics literature.
In contrast, the possible ineﬃciency of national environmental policies when pollut-
ing firms are national has been studied by several authors. This literature provides a
starting point and background for the present study. It is well established that when
the international market is perfectly competitive and environmental damage caused by
emissions is local, there is no reason to expect environmental policy of a small country
to be distorted.2 However, when polluting firms have market power matters may be
diﬀerent.
In a framework of strategic trade policy introduced by Brander and Spencer (1985),3
Barrett (1994) and Ulph (1996) show that national governments set emission standards
that lead to marginal cost of abatement being lower than marginal damage caused by
emissions. In a similar setting, Conrad (1993) and Kennedy (1994) show that non-
cooperative emission tax rates are lower than the tax rate that would prevail if the
national governments coordinated their policies so as to maximize joint welfare of the
1See UNCTAD (2000) and Markusen (1998).
2See e.g. Oates and Schwab (1988), Rauscher (1994), and Ulph (1997).
3See Brander (1995) for a survey of this literature.
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countries. Intuition for these results is the following. Relaxing environmental standards
induces domestic producers to expand output and their foreign rivals to reduce output.
Increased market share yields higher profits for domestic shareholders and this positive
eﬀect dominates the negative welfare-eﬀect caused by increased emissions.4 All these
papers study policy design in the presence of single plant, immobile firms.
Several authors have also analyzed the implications of plant mobility on the non-
cooperative environmental policy design. Ulph and Valentini (2001) compare the non-
cooperative environmental policies when polluting firms first decide where to locate and
governments then choose policies and when the governments first commit to policies
and the firms then choose their location. They study the issue in the strategic trade
policy framework with two single-plant firms and show that environmental policy may
be stricter in the case where the governments first commit to policies, that is, when the
firms are completely foot-loose. Rauscher (1995) and Hoel (1997) in turn consider the
eﬃciency of non-cooperative environmental policies in a setting where the governments
first commit to a policy and the single-plant firms then locate to the country with the
most favorable policy. In this setting, non-cooperative policies may be either too strict
or too lax. Dijkstra (2003) also studies policy design with and without commitment but
in a setting of a single firm and quantity restrictions instead of taxation. He compares
regional and national policy design and shows that regional policy design may be better
when the governments cannot commit.
In Markusen et al. (1995) multinational production may arise. A single firm must
decide whether to set up a production plant in two countries or in one country only.
The trade-oﬀ for the firm is between transportation costs and plant-level fixed costs.
Markusen et al. analyze environmental policy design in two cases: 1) the firm first
chooses the location of production and the governments then choose policies and 2)
policies are chosen before location of production. They then compare welfare and
pollution levels in the two countries in these two cases. Markusen (1997) in turn
considers two national firms and studies how their decision to remain national or become
4As noted by several authors, these results may change if producers compete in prices instead of
quantities (see e.g. Eaton and Grossman, 1986, Barrett, 1994, and Conrad, 1996), if there are general
equilibrium eﬀects in factor markets (see e.g. Dixit and Grossman, 1986, and Rauscher, 1994) or if
the domestic production sector consists of several firms (Barrett, 1994, and Nannerup, 2001).
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multinational is aﬀected by strict environmental regulation, but does not study policy
design.
This paper focuses on the design of national environmental policy in the presence
of multinational firms producing in two countries. In general, there may be several rea-
sons to become multinational.5 We do not study the decision to become multinational,
but assume instead that the industry already exists when environmental regulation is
imposed on the firms. The main questions to be addressed are: How does emergence
of multinational firms change the incentives of national governments for environmental
regulation? What are the sources of potential ineﬃciencies in national policy design?
When the polluting firms are multinational, would coordination of environmental poli-
cies imply more lax or more severe regulation?
Following the literature on strategic trade and environmental policy, we build a
two country model of regulatory competition and extend it to multinational firms.
Each national government controls the level of emissions by levying a tax on emissions
generated in its country. The governments are constrained to set a uniform tax rate that
applies to all polluting plants within their territory.6 Policy design is analyzed under
two diﬀerent industry structures. In the first case, the two countries are occupied
by national firms that serve the foreign market by exports. In the second case, the
countries are occupied by multinational firms. By multinational firms we mean firms
that have production plants in more than one country and are therefore able to shift
production from one country to another as a reaction to government policies. This
reflects the assumption stated above that being multinational is advantageous in the
sense that it allows the firm to respond more eﬃciently to changes in national regulatory
environment.7
5For a survey of the literature on multinational production, see Markusen (1998, 1995). We discuss
the rationale for multinational production in more detail in the third essay of this dissertation and
analyze the decision to become multinational.
6This would be the case for instance within the EU single market.
7The framework in Hoel (1997) resembles our approach although does not include multinational
production. In Hoel, the governments first choose policies and each firm then decides where to locate.
In the policy stage, there are multiple equilibria. Firms make zero profit and, consequently, the
allocation of firms and production is arbitrary. If the two governments have chosen same policies,
production takes place in both countries assuming that half of the firms locate in each country. Here,
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We confirm the previous finding that setting emission taxation in a non-cooperative
manner leads to too lax emission regulation when the polluting firms are national.
However, when the polluting firms are multinational, competition between the govern-
ments leads to too severe emission taxation. Thus, relaxing emission taxation from
the non-cooperative level increases welfare in both countries. The reason is that the
incentives of national governments for environmental regulation change in two ways
when firms are multinational as opposed to being national. First, multinational firms
react in the same way to any policy change. Hence, changes in environmental policy do
not influence the market share of the domestic firm and, consequently, environmental
policy is not useful in shifting rents to domestic shareholders. Second, when polluting
firms are multinational, in each country there is a production plant that is entirely
in foreign ownership. When setting policies, national governments ignore profits that
accrue to foreign shareholders of these plants and are inclined to set too severe emission
taxation.8
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the
set-up. In sections 3 and 4 we analyze emission tax policies in the case of national firms
and multinational firms. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Set-Up
We consider a model of two identical countries, home and foreign, and a polluting
industry consisting of one firm in each country. Consumers in the two countries benefit
from consumption of the good produced by the firms, but experience a welfare loss due
to harmful emissions generated by production. Both firms may supply both foreign and
in the case of multinational firms, firms are established in two countries when the governments choose
policies. After that the firms decide where to produce which then unambiguosly determines overall
output in the two countries.
8This motive for taxation is also present in previous work on corporate taxation, for instance in
Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) in a context of a small open economy and in Janeba (1996) in a framework
of strategic trade policy. In Janeba the two firms are single-plant firms and produce in the same country,
but one of them operates through a subsidiary.
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home market. The aggregate supply in home market, X, is
X = xH + xF ,
where xH is supply by home firm and xF supply by foreign firm. In the same manner,
aggregate supply in foreign market, X∗, is
X∗ = x∗H + x∗F ,
where x∗H is supply by home firm and x∗F is supply by foreign firm. The revenue of
firm j = H,F is then
p (X)xj + p (X∗)x∗j,
where p (·) is the inverse demand function in the two countries. We will assume that
Assumption 1 Demand function satisfies:9
p0 (·) < 0and p00 (·) h+ p0 (·) < 0 for h = xH , xF , x∗H , x∗F .
The plant level production cost function for each firm is c(·). The two firms possess
technology to abate emissions generated by production and the plant level abatement
cost function for both firms is g (·). Throughout the paper we assume that
Assumption 2 Production and abatement cost functions satisfy:
c0 (·) > 0, g0 (·) > 0, and c00 (·) > 0, g00 (·) > 0.
Assumption 1 implies decreasing marginal revenue. Convex production costs in turn
reflect the idea that expanding production in one plant becomes increasingly costly as
the level of production increases. Constant marginal costs would imply that production
in one plant could be increased without limit and even a marginal change in emission
9Derivates of functions of one argument are denoted by primes. Subscripts refer to partial derivatives
of functions of several arguments.
49
tax rate would induce multinational firms to shift all production from one country to an-
other.10 Together Assumptions 1 and 2 are suﬃcient to guarantee that the second-order
conditions for profit maximization for national and multinational firms are satisfied and
that the reaction functions of the firms are downward sloping.
Let yj denote the plant level production of firm j. We choose units of emission
so that when the plant level abatement of firm j is aj, emissions generated by the
production of that plant, ej, are
ej = yj − aj.
National governments control the level of emissions by levying an emission tax. Each
government levies a tax on emissions generated in its own country.11 Tax revenue is
distributed back to consumers as lump sum transfers. Let t = (t, t∗) denote the vector
of emission tax rates where t is the tax rate in home country and t∗ in foreign country.
Emissions generated by production are local, and the overall level of emissions in home
country is E and in foreign country E∗. The negative welfare-eﬀect of emissions is d (E)
in home country and d (E∗) in foreign country with d0 (·) > 0 and d00 (·) ≥ 0.
Using the framework presented above, we will analyze the design of environmental
policy under two diﬀerent industry structures. In the first case to be analyzed, firms
are national and may serve foreign market by exports. Total costs of production for
home firm are then
c
¡
yH
¢
+ g
¡
aH
¢
+ teH
and for foreign firm
c
¡
yF
¢
+ g
¡
aF
¢
+ t∗eF .
As both firms have only one production plant, E = eH and E∗ = eF .
10Plant level fixed set-up costs are not explicitly considered here as the number of plants is exogenous.
We assume that these costs are such that only two firms exist in the market despite the convex
production costs.
11An alternative approach would be to consider quantity restrictions. In the setting of strategic
environmental policy, these two instruments need not be exactly equivalent. See Ulph (1996) and
references therein.
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In the second case, the two countries are occupied by two multinational firms, both
having one production plant in each country. In order to distinguish between the two
plants of one firm located in diﬀerent countries, we let a star refer to a production plant
located in foreign country. Total costs of production for firm j are then
c
¡
yj
¢
+ c
¡
y∗j
¢
+ g
¡
aj
¢
+ g
¡
a∗j
¢
+ tej + t∗e∗j.
Consequently, when firms are multinational, E = eH+eF and E∗ = e∗H+e∗F . Through-
out the paper we consider a simple ownership structure where home firm is owned by
residents of home country and foreign firm by residents of foreign firm.12
Timing of the events is as follows. The national governments of the two countries
first simultaneously set their emission tax rates. After the policies have been chosen,
the firms decide how much to produce and how much to supply in each market. The
multinational firms also decide where to produce. We solve the problem in the usual
manner by backward induction.
3 Tax Policy and National Firms
This section provides a background and starting point for the next section, where
environmental policy in the presence of multinational firms is analyzed. The results of
this section are qualitatively same as in the previous literature. That is, when polluting
firms are national and compete in Cournot manner, national environmental policies are
too lax.13
We begin by solving the profit maximization problems of the national firms given the
tax policies chosen by the two governments. After that we consider first non-cooperative
policy design and then policy design under coordination. Countries being identical, we
focus mainly on home firm and home government.
12On the eﬀect of cross-ownership on government policies, see Van Long and Soubeyran (2001) and
Huizinga and Nielsen (1997). On endogenous ownership structure, see Olsen and Osmundsen (2001)
and references therein.
13Our model most closely resembles that in Kennedy (1994).
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3.1 National Firms
Let πH denote profits of home firm. Given any pair of tax rates (t, t∗) set by the national
governments, the profit maximization problem of home firm is
max
yH ,aH ,x∗H
πH = p (X) xH + p (X∗) x∗H − c
¡
yH
¢
− g
¡
aH
¢
− teH
whereX andX∗ are aggregate supplies in home and foreign market and xH = yH−x∗H .
The first-order conditions for profit maximization for home firm are
∂πH
∂yH = p
0 (X) xH + p (X)− c0
¡
yH
¢
− t = 0, (1)
∂πH
∂aH = t− g
0 ¡aH¢ = 0, (2)
∂πH
∂x∗H = p
0 (X∗)x∗H + p (X∗)− p0 (X)xH − p (X) = 0. (3)
The first-order conditions of foreign firm are derived in an analogous manner. The
conditions imply that decisions on output, abatement, and supply are optimal when
marginal production cost equals marginal revenue, marginal abatement cost equals
emission tax rate, and marginal revenues in the two markets are equalized. We denote
the profit maximizing output, supplies, and emission level of firm j as a function of
the tax rates by yj (t), xj (t), x∗j (t), and ej (t). As demand conditions are identical in
the two countries, the firms divide their output equally between the two markets, i.e.
x∗j (t) = xj (t) for j = H,F . Consequently, X∗ (t) = X (t).
Given Assumptions 1 and 2, from the first-order conditions it follows that
Lemma 1 When home government tightens emission control, home firm cuts down
supply in both markets and foreign firm expands supply in both markets. Emissions
decrease in home country and increase in foreign country. Aggregate supply in both
markets and overall emissions decrease.
Proof. See Appendix.
By using conditions (1)-(3), the eﬀect of a marginal policy change by home govern-
ment on the profit of home firm can be expressed as
πHt (t) = −eH (t) + p0 (X (t))xFt (t) yH (t) , (4)
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where xFt (t) is the marginal change in profit maximizing supply of foreign firm in each
market. The direct eﬀect of a higher tax rate is the increased tax burden on each unit
of emissions captured by the first term in equation (4). The second term in turn reflects
the eﬀect of a tax change on the profit of home firm through supply decisions of its
rival. Since xFt (t) > 0, this eﬀect is negative in both markets. Thus, πHt (t) < 0.
In the same manner, the eﬀect of a marginal policy change by home government on
the profit of foreign firm is
πFt (t) = p0 (X (t))xHt (t) yF (t) , (5)
where xHt (t) is the marginal change in profit maximizing supply of home firm in home
and foreign market. As xHt (t) < 0, it directly follows that πFt (t) > 0.
Equations (4) and (5) imply that by relaxing environmental standards home govern-
ment increases profits of home firm and reduces profits of its rival. These asymmetric
eﬀects of taxation enable national governments to use environmental policy to shift
profits for domestic producers.
3.2 Emission Tax Competition
Consider now the problem of the national governments when they choose their tax
policies non-cooperatively taking the tax policy of the other government and the equi-
librium behavior of the firms as given. The objective of each government is to maximize
domestic aggregate welfare which consists of profits of the national firm, consumer sur-
plus, tax revenue, and disutility from pollution. We denote aggregate welfare in home
country by w and in foreign country by w∗. Home government then chooses t so as to
maximize
w = πH (t) +
Z X
0
p (h) dh− p (X (t))X (t) + tE (t)− d (E (t)) .
The first-order conditions for welfare maximization, wt = 0 and w∗t∗ = 0, implicitly
determine equilibrium tax rates. Under the assumption that the second-order conditions
for welfare maximization are satisfied, the first-order conditions determine a unique
equilibrium. We denote this equilibrium by tn = (tn, t∗n), where superscript n refers
to non-cooperative outcome. Because the firms and countries are identical, tn = t∗n.
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As a result, in the non-cooperative equilibrium, the level of output and emissions are
the same in the two countries, i.e. yH (tn) = yF (tn) and E (tn) = E∗ (tn). Hence, the
first-order condition for home government can be written as
(tn − d0 (E (tn)))Et (tn) = p0 (X (tn)) xHt (tn)X (tn) , (6)
where in the left hand side we have the welfare-eﬀect through a change in emissions and
in the right hand side the welfare-eﬀect through a change in supply. As xHt (t) < 0, the
right hand side of equation (6) is strictly positive. In addition, by Lemma 1, Et (t) < 0.
Hence, in a symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium
t∗n = tn < d0 (E (tn)) = d0 (E∗ (tn)) ,
i.e. equilibrium tax rates are lower than the marginal damage caused by emissions.
3.3 Coordinated Tax Policies
We now turn to the problem of the national governments when they coordinate policies
and choose emission tax rates so as to maximize joint welfare of the two countries, W .
Joint welfare consists of profits of the two national firms and consumer surplus, tax
revenue, and disutility of pollution in the two countries. Hence, the objective of the
governments is to choose (t, t∗) so as to maximize
W = πH (t) + πF (t) + cs (t) + cs∗ (t) + tE (t) + t∗E∗ (t)− d (E (t))− d (E∗ (t)) ,
where
cs∗ (t) = cs (t) =
Z X
0
p (h) dh− p (X (t))X (t)
since X∗ (t) = X (t) for all tax rates.
Again, under the assumption that Wtt ≤ 0 and Wt∗t∗ ≤ 0, the first-order conditions
determine a unique equilibrium denoted by to = (to, t∗o), where superscript o refers to
the cooperative outcome. Due to the symmetry of the countries, to = t∗o and therefore,
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yH (to) = yF (to) and E (to) = E∗ (to). The first-order condition for home government
can then be expressed as
(to − d0 (E (to))) (Et (to) + E∗t (to)) = p0 (X (to))
¡
yHt (t
o) + yFt (t
o)
¢
xH (to) , (7)
where in the left hand side we have the eﬀect of a tax increase through change in
emissions and in the right hand side the eﬀect of a tax increase through changes in
supplies. Lemma 1 implies that the right hand side is strictly positive and that Et (t)+
E∗t (t) < 0. Thus
t∗o = to < d0 (E (to)) = d0 (E∗ (to)) .
Not surprisingly, in the cooperative equilibrium, marginal damage of emissions is
higher than emission tax rates. Complete internalization of the damage caused by
emissions is not socially desirable as tightening emission control induces polluting firms
with market power to further reduce suboptimally low supply.14
Direct comparison of the first-order conditions (6) and (7) does not reveal in what
way and why the non-cooperative outcome is ineﬃcient. In order to establish what
kind of policy change would increase joint welfare of the two countries from the non-
cooperative level, we evaluate Wt and Wt∗ at the non-cooperative equilibrium.
If Wt > 0 and Wt∗ > 0 at (tn, t∗n), we conclude that a policy change introducing a
marginal increase in tax rates from the non-cooperative level would increase welfare in
both countries. By using equation (6) we have that at (tn, t∗n)
Wt = (t
∗n − d0 (E∗ (tn)))E∗t (tn)− p0 (X (tn)) xFt (tn)X (tn) , (8)
which consists of three diﬀerent welfare-eﬀects that home government imposes on foreign
consumers when it tightens emission taxation. First, a higher tax rate in home country
increases emissions and tax revenue in foreign country. Since t∗n < d0 (E∗ (tn)), this
reduces welfare of foreign consumers. Second, an increase in t induces home firm to cut
down production and reduce supply in both markets. This increases profits for foreign
firm but reduces consumer surplus in foreign country. In a symmetric equilibrium these
14This is the same mechanism, unrelated to regulatory competition, as in Barnett (1980). See also
Kennedy (1994).
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two eﬀects cancel each other. Third, the supply expansion by foreign firm increases
consumer surplus in foreign country. This positive eﬀect is captured by the last term
in equation (8).
Consequently, an increase in t has a negative eﬀect on foreign welfare through in-
creased emissions but a positive eﬀect through larger consumer surplus. However, it
can be shown that in the non-cooperative equilibrium, the relative size of these two
eﬀects is such that
Proposition 1 When the two countries are occupied by national firms, setting policies
non-cooperatively leads to too lax emission regulation.
Proof. See Appendix.
The non-cooperative tax rates are lower than cooperative tax rates that maximize
the joint welfare of the two countries. From Lemma 1 it then also follows that level of
emissions in both countries and supply in both markets are higher in the non-cooperative
equilibrium than when decisions on taxation are taken in a coordinated manner.
4 Tax Policy and Multinational Firms
In this section, we consider multinational firms that have production plants in both
countries. The crucial diﬀerence with the previous analysis is that multinational firms
are able to react to policy changes not only by adjusting supply and abatement levels,
but also by shifting production from one country to another. As in the previous section,
we assume that home firm is entirely owned by consumers in home country and foreign
firm is owned by foreign consumers.
We proceed as in section 3 by first solving the profit maximization problems of the
firms and then considering policy design.
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4.1 Multinational Firms
Given emission taxes (t, t∗) set by the national governments, profit maximization prob-
lem of firm j is
max
yj ,aj ,y∗j ,a∗j ,ij
πj = p (X)xj + p (X∗)x∗j − c
¡
yj
¢
− g
¡
aj
¢
− tej − c
¡
y∗j
¢
− g
¡
a∗j
¢
− t∗e∗j,
where firm j’s output in home country is yj and output in foreign country y∗j. Supply
in home market is xj = yj + ij and supply in foreign market is x∗j = y∗j − ij. The
first-order conditions for profit maximization for home firm are
∂πH
∂yH = p
0 (X) xH + p (X)− c0
¡
yH
¢
− t = 0, (9)
∂πH
∂aH = t− g
0 ¡aH¢ = 0, (10)
∂πH
∂y∗H = p
0 (X∗)x∗H + p (X∗)− c0
¡
y∗H
¢
− t∗ = 0, (11)
∂πH
∂a∗H = t
∗ − g0
¡
a∗H
¢
= 0, (12)
∂πH
∂iH = p
0 (X) xH + p (X)− p0 (X∗)x∗H − p (X∗) = 0. (13)
The first-order conditions for foreign firm are again analogous. Together these con-
ditions imply that multinational firms choose levels of output, abatement, and imports
so that marginal production cost equals marginal revenue, marginal abatement cost
equals emission tax rate, and marginal revenues from the two markets are equalized.
As in the case of national firms, we denote the optimal output, supply, and abatement
levels as a function of the tax rates for firm j by yj (t), y∗j (t), xj (t), etc. Due to
identical demand conditions in the two countries, we again have that x∗j (t) = xj (t)
for j = H,F and consequently X∗ (t) = X (t).
From the first-order conditions we can deduce that
Lemma 2 When home government tightens emission control, both multinational firms
cut back on production in home country and increase production in foreign country.
Both firms reduce supply in both markets. Emissions decrease in home country and
increase in foreign country. Overall emissions decrease.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Comparison with Lemma 1 shows that regardless of whether firms are national or
multinational, aggregate supply in both markets and overall emissions decrease when
either of the governments tightens emission control. The diﬀerence is that multina-
tional firms react symmetrically to any policy change. Assume, for instance, that home
government tightens pollution control. If the firms are national, foreign firm increases
and home firm reduces supply in both markets. If the firms are multinational, both
firms reduce supply in both markets.
Lemma 2 implies that the two multinational firms always produce equal output in
their plants located in the same country, i.e. yH (t) = yF (t) and y∗H (t) = y∗F (t).
Hence, xH (t) = xF (t) and the eﬀects of an increase in the tax rate in home country
on the profits are
πHt (t) = −eH (t) + p0 (X (t))xFt (t)
¡
yH (t) + y∗H (t)
¢
(14)
and
πFt (t) = −eF (t) + p0 (X (t)) xHt (t)
¡
yF (t) + y∗F (t)
¢
, (15)
where the first term is the increased tax burden on each unit of emissions. The second
term is the indirect eﬀect of a policy change through supply decisions of the rival
firm. When emission taxation becomes stricter in home country, both firms increase
production in their plant located in foreign country but reduce supply in both markets.
This implies that using environmental policy to increase market share of the domestic
producer is not feasible when firms are multinational.
When the firms are multinational, in each country there is a production plant that
belongs to a firm that is owned by foreign shareholders. Had the national governments
the possibility, they would tax more severely emissions generated by the plant in for-
eign ownership. Hence, the restriction that national governments cannot discriminate
between the firms, but are constrained to set a uniform emission tax rate that applies
to all firms operating within the country, plays a crucial role.
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4.2 Emission Tax Competition
We now analyze the design of emission taxation when the national governments act
non-cooperatively taking the policy of the other government and the equilibrium be-
havior of the polluting firms as given. The countries are again symmetric, and we will
mainly focus on home government. Each government chooses its tax policy to maximize
domestic aggregate welfare taking the policy of the other government as given. The
objective of home government is thus to choose t so as to maximize
w = cs (t) + πH (t) + tE (t)− d (E (t)) ,
and the objective of foreign government is to choose t∗ so as to maximize
w∗ = cs∗ (t) + πF (t) + t∗E∗ (t)− d (E∗ (t)) .
Under the assumption that the second-order conditions are satisfied, the first-order
conditions, wt = 0 and w∗t∗ = 0, again determine a unique non-cooperative equilibrium,
tn = (tn, t∗n). Since the firms and countries are identical and the ownership structure of
the multinational firms is symmetric, tn = t∗n. Thus, in equilibrium the output of each
firm is the same in the two plants and emission levels in the two countries are equal,
i.e. yH (tn) = y∗H (tn) and eH (tn) = e∗H (tn). Then, by taking into account (14) and
(15), the equilibrium condition for home government can be written as
(tn − d0 (E (tn)))Et (tn)− p0 (X (tn)) xFt (tn)X (tn) + eH (tn) = 0. (16)
The first term in condition (16) is the welfare-eﬀect of a change in emissions. The
second term reflects the welfare-eﬀect of a tax increase through market price. This
term is negative as the negative eﬀect of a reduction in output on consumer surplus
dominates the positive eﬀect on profits. The last term reflects the eﬀect of increased tax
revenue from foreign owners of the multinational firms and is strictly positive. Hence,
t∗n = tn T d0 (E (tn)) = d0 (E∗ (tn)) ,
and we have that
Lemma 3 For multinational firms, non-cooperative tax rates may be higher or lower
than the marginal damage of emissions depending on whether the positive eﬀect of
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increased tax revenue from owners of the foreign multinational firm or the negative
eﬀect of reduced consumer surplus dominates.
Proof. Follows directly from equation (16) and Lemma 2.
Equilibrium tax rates may exceed marginal damage of emissions because setting a
higher tax rate yields increased tax revenue from foreign shareholders of the multina-
tional firms.
4.3 Coordinated Tax Policies
We now turn to the situation where the governments coordinate tax policies in order to
maximize joint welfare of the two countries which consists of consumer surplus in the
two countries, profits of the firms, tax revenues and disutility from pollution. Hence,
under coordination, the governments choose t and t∗ so as to maximize
W = cs (t) + cs∗ (t) + πH (t) + πF (t) + tE (t)− d (E (t)) + t∗E∗ (t)− d (E∗ (t)) .
As in the previous cases studied, under the assumption that the second-order condi-
tions are satisfied, the first-order conditions determine a unique cooperative equilibrium
to = (to, t∗o) with to = t∗o. Therefore, yH (to) = y∗H (to) and e∗H (to) = eH (to). Thus,
taking into account (14) and (15), the first-order condition for home government can
be written as
(to − d0 (E (to))) (Et (to) + E∗t (to)) = p0 (X (to))
¡
xFt (t
o) + xHt (t
o)
¢
X (to) . (17)
Since xHt (t) < 0 and x
F
t (t) < 0, the right hand side is strictly positive. Furthermore,
(Et (t) + E
∗
t (t)) < 0. Therefore, it readily follows that
t∗o = to < d0 (E (to)) = d0 (E∗ (to)) .
While non-cooperative tax rates may be higher than the marginal damage of emissions,
coordinated tax rates are always lower than the marginal damage. The reason is the
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same as when the firms are national. Completely internalizing the negative eﬀects of
emissions is not socially beneficial as it would lead to too large reductions in supply.
As in the case of national firms, we wish to analyze the relationship of the non-
cooperative and coordinated outcome. In order to compare the outcome when the
governments set their policies in a non-cooperative manner and when they coordinate
policies, we again evaluate Wt at the non-cooperative equilibrium. By using equation
(16), we have that Wt evaluated at (tn, t∗n) is
Wt = −p0 (X (tn))
£
Xt (t
n)− xHt (tn)
¤
X (tn) + (t∗n − d0 (E∗ (tn)))E∗t (tn)− eH (tn)
(18)
where the right hand side reflects all the eﬀects of tighter emission taxation in home
country on the welfare of foreign consumers. First, when home government increases
emission tax, both firms reduce supply in foreign market. This increases market price
reducing consumer surplus and increasing profits. The negative eﬀect on consumer
surplus dominates the positive eﬀect on profits. This eﬀect is captured by the first
term in (18). Second, when home government increases its emission tax, emissions in
foreign country increase. The second term in equation (18) reflects the welfare-eﬀect
of increased emissions in foreign country. If t∗n < d0 (E∗ (tn)) this eﬀect is negative.
Finally, the last term captures the eﬀect of a higher tax rate on foreign owners of
multinational firms in the form of increased tax burden on each unit of emissions gen-
erated in their plant located in home country. This eﬀect is always negative. Hence, if
t∗n < d0 (E∗ (tn)), all these welfare-eﬀects are negative.
However, it can be shown that even if t∗n > d0 (E∗ (tn)), the positive eﬀect of
increased tax revenue net of environmental damage never dominates the negative eﬀects
that a higher tax rate in home country has on welfare in foreign country. Hence,
Proposition 2 When the two countries are occupied by multinational firms, setting
emission taxation non-cooperatively leads to excessively severe taxation.
Proof. See Appendix.
The non-cooperative tax rates are higher than cooperative tax rates that maximize
the joint welfare of the two countries. Lemma 2 then implies that also the level of
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emissions in both countries is lower and supply in both markets is smaller in the non-
cooperative equilibrium than when decisions on taxation are taken in a coordinated
manner. As the multinational firms react in the same way to any policy change, policy
changes do not influence the market shares of the firms. Hence, the main motive
for relaxing environmental taxation when firms are national does not exist when they
are multinational. Furthermore, the existence of a foreign production plant in each
country creates an incentive to tax foreign owners of multinational firms. As a result,
coordination of environmental policies would increase welfare in both countries and
would call for a reduction in emission tax rates from the non-cooperative level.
5 Conclusions
The literature on strategic environmental policy exhibits well known results on non-
cooperative environmental policy setting when polluting firms are national. In this
paper, we have extended this analysis to a situation of multinational production where
polluting firms are able to move production from one country to another as a reaction
to government policies. We showed that the incentives of national governments change
for environmental regulation in two important ways when the firms are multinational
as opposed to being national.
First, national polluting firms react asymmetrically to any policy change by national
governments. For instance, tightening emission control in home country induces foreign
firm to expand supply and home firm to cut down supply in both markets. These
asymmetric reactions to policy changes enable governments to use environmental policy
as a means to increase the market share of the domestic firm and the profits of the
domestic shareholders. Multinational firms, in contrast, react in the same way to any
policy change. A higher tax rate in one country induces both firms to shift production
to the other country and to reduce overall production. Consequently, relaxing emission
taxation is not useful in shifting profits to domestic shareholders as changes in taxation
do not influence market shares of the firms.
Second, when polluting firms are multinational, in each country there is a production
plant that is in foreign ownership. When setting policies, national governments ignore
profits that accrue to foreign shareholders of these plants and are thus inclined to
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set too severe emission taxation. As a result, while non-cooperative taxation is too lax
when firms are national, it is too severe when firms are multinational. Relaxing emission
taxation from the non-cooperative level in both countries would unambiguously increase
welfare in the two countries. Of course, environmental regulation may be too lax for
reasons not accounted for in this analysis, but the ability of the firms to react to policy
changes by moving production from one country to another does not seem to aggravate
the problem.
It is useful to note though that here the national governments have several objec-
tives: they want to limit the negative eﬀects of harmful emissions, they care about the
profits of domestic shareholders and domestic consumer surplus, and, when the firms
are multinational, they also wish to tax profits accruing to foreign shareholders. But
the only instrument available to the national governments is emission taxation. This
assumption is motivated by the existence of international agreements that restrict the
possibilities of governments to use direct trade policy measures or to discriminate be-
tween production plants on the basis of their ownership. If, in contrast, the governments
had a portfolio of instruments available, environmental policy would not necessarily be
used for all the purposes mentioned above in which case the need for coordination
might not exist. In addition, as is well known from previous literature, the policy
conclusions of the strategic trade policy model when firms are national depend on the
mode of competition in the oligopolistic market. Whether this is true also when firms
are multinational is a topic for further research.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. As the markets are identical, xj (t) = x∗j (t) for j = H,F .
Given this, let us denote profits of firm j by πj
¡
yH , yF
¢
. Totally diﬀerentiating the
first-order conditions of home firm gives
dyH
dt
=
πF22
D
,
dyH
dt∗
= −π
F
21
D
, and
daH
dt
=
1
g00 (aH)
,
where
D = πH11πF22 − πF21πH12 > 0.
From these relations it then follows that
deH
dt
<
dyH
dt
< 0,
dx∗H
dt
=
dxH
dt
< 0, and
deH
dt∗
=
dyH
dt∗
> 0,
dxH
dt∗
=
dx∗H
dt∗
> 0.
Since πF22 < πF21 < 0, it also follows that
d(yH+yF )
dt
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. The first-order condition for foreign government can be
written as
(t∗n − d0 (E∗ (tn))) = p
0 (X (tn))xFt∗ (t
n)X (tn)
E∗t∗ (t
n)
.
Substituting this expression for t∗n − d0 (E∗ (tn)) in (8) yields
Wt =
p0 (X (tn))xFt∗ (t
n)X (tn)E∗t (t
n)
E∗t∗ (t
n)
− p0 (X (tn)) xFt (tn)X (tn)
= p0 (X (tn))X (tn)E∗t (t
n)
·
xFt∗ (t
n)
E∗t∗ (t
n)
− x
F
t (t
n)
E∗t (t
n)
¸
,
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where the part before the square brackets is negative as p0 (X (tn)) < 0 and E∗t (t
n) > 0.
When firms are national, E∗ (t) = eF (t) = yF (t)−aF (t). Furthermore, since yF (t) =
2xF (t) it follows that
E∗t (t
n) = 2xFt (t
n)− aFt (t) and E∗t∗ (tn) = 2xFt∗ (tn)− aFt∗ (t) ,
where aFt (t) = 0 and a
F
t∗ (t) > 0. Consequently,
0 <
xFt∗ (t
n)
E∗t∗ (t
n)
<
xFt (t
n)
E∗t (t
n)
and the term inside the square brackets is negative. Hence, evaluated at the non-
cooperative equilibrium, Wt > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Again xj (t) = x∗j (t) for j = H,F . Let us denote the
profit function for firm j by πj
¡
yH , y∗H , yF , y∗F
¢
. By totally diﬀerentiating first-order
conditions (9), (12), and the corresponding first-order conditions for foreign firm then
gives


πH11 πH12 πH13 πH14
πH21 πH22 πH23 πH24
πF31 πF32 πF33 πF34
πF41 πF42 πF43 πF44




dyH
dy∗H
dyF
dy∗F

 =


dt
dt∗
dt
dt∗


Taking into account Assumptions 1 and 2 implies that
πH11 = πH22 = πF33 = πF44
and πH11 < πH12 < πH13 < 0. Furthermore, πHkh = πFhk where k = 1, 2 and h = 3, 4 and
πH12 = πH21 = πF34 = πF43. Consequently,
dyH
dt
=
C
D
< 0 and
dyH
dt∗
=
E
D
> 0,
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where
D =
¡
πH11 − πH12
¢¡πH11 + πH22¢2 − ¡2πH13¢2| {z }
+

 < 0,
C =
¡
πH11 + πH13
¢| {z }
−

πH11 − πH13| {z }
−
+ πH12 − πH13| {z }
−

 > 0 and
E = −
¡
πH12 + πH13
¢| {z }
−

πH11 − πH13| {z }
−
+ πH12 − πH13| {z }
−

 < 0.
In addition,
daH
dt
=
1
g00 (aH)
> 0 and
da∗H
dt
= 0.
From the above relations it follows that
deH
dt
<
dxH
dt
< 0,
dy∗H
dt
=
de∗H
dt
> 0, and
diH
dt
> 0.
As the firms are identical, y∗F (t) = y∗H (t) and yF (t) = yH (t). Using the above
relations for home and foreign firm then implies that
d (E + E∗)
dt
< 0,
dX
dt
< 0, and
dX∗
dt
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. The first-order condition for foreign government can be
written as
t∗n − d0 (E∗ (tn)) =
p0 (X (tn))
£
Xt∗ (t
n)− xHt∗ (tn)
¤
X (tn)− e∗H (tn)
E∗t∗ (t
n)
=
p0 (X (tn))xFt∗ (t
n)X (tn)− e∗H (tn)
E∗t∗ (t
n)
(A1)
where the second equality uses xFt∗ (t) = x
H
t∗ (t). Let
κ = E
∗
t (t
n)
E∗t∗ (t
n)
=
y∗Ht (t
n)− a∗Ht (tn) + y∗Ft (tn)− a∗Ft (tn)
y∗Ht∗ (t
n)− a∗Ht∗ (tn) + y∗Ft∗ (tn)− a∗Ft∗ (tn)
=
y∗Ft (t
n) + y∗Ht (t
n)
y∗Ht∗ (t
n)− a∗Ht∗ (tn) + y∗Ft∗ (tn)− a∗Ft∗ (tn)
,
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where the last equality follows from a∗Ht (t
n) = a∗Ft (t
n) = 0. From Lemma 2 it follows
that a∗Ht∗ (t
n) > 0, a∗Ft∗ (t
n) > 0, y∗Ht (t
n) = y∗Ft (t
n) > 0, and y∗Ht∗ (t
n) = y∗Ft∗ (t
n) < 0.
Furthermore, since the production cost function is convex, y∗Ht (t
n) + y∗Ht∗ (t
n) < 0.
Consequently,
−1 < κ < 0. (A2)
Substituting (A1) for t∗n − d0 (E∗ (tn)) in (18) yields
Wt = −p0 (X (tn)) xFt (tn)X (tn) +
p0 (X (tn)) xFt∗ (t
n)X (tn)− e∗H (tn)
E∗t∗ (t
n)
E∗t (t
n)− eH (tn)
= −p0 (X (tn))X (tn)
£
xFt (t
n)− xFt∗ (tn)κ
¤
− eH (tn) [κ+ 1] ,
where the second equality uses e∗H (tn) = eH (tn). Since p0 (X (t)) < 0, xFt (t) < 0,
and xFt∗ (t) < 0, taking into account (A2) shows that Wt < 0 in the non-cooperative
equilibrium.
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Essay III
International Trade Agreements, Environmental Policy, and
Emergence of Multinational Firms
Abstract
During recent decades there has been substantial momentum for trade liberal-
ization. At the same time, environmental policy has largely remained at the dis-
cretion of national governments. This paper studies how free trade agreements in-
fluence national environmental policies and location strategies of polluting firms.
When the national governments cannot use direct trade policy measures, envi-
ronmental policy is distorted towards enhancing the competitiveness of domestic
producers. When this is the case, signing agreements that prevent the use of
trade policy may lead to firms investing in production capacity abroad.
Keywords: Environmental policy, foreign direct investment, multinational pro-
duction, trade agreements
JEL Classification: H23, H77, F18, F23
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1 Introduction
During the last few decades multinational firms have become increasingly important in
international competition. The emergence of multinational firms has been followed by a
substantial theoretical and empirical literature analyzing the rationale for multinational
production. The starting point of this literature has been that since operating in a
foreign country will necessarily incur some cost, becoming multinational must bring
some oﬀ-setting advantages.
An organizing framework for studying the benefits of multinational production has
been the OLI framework, according to which multinational production will take place if
three prerequisites, ownership, location, and internalization advantages, are satisfied.1
For instance, Horstman and Markusen (1992) and Brainard (1993) show in a setting of
identical countries that horizontal multinational firms are more likely to arise if plant-
level fixed costs are low and firm-level fixed costs and transportation costs are high.
Devereux and Hubbard (2000) extend the set-up to study the eﬀect of diﬀerent corpo-
rate tax systems on outbound investment when the tax system in the host country of
the investment is given. Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) study heterogenous coun-
tries and further show that multinational production occurs when countries are similar
in size as well as in relative factor endowment. Some recent papers study endoge-
nous industry structures in a setting where both horizontal and vertical multinational
firms may emerge. See e.g. Markusen and Maskus (2001a, 2001b).2 In short, vertical
multinational production would emerge especially in situations where countries under
study have very diﬀerent relative factor endowments and trade costs, including tariﬀs
and other methods of protectionism, are low. These findings lie in conformity with
empirical evidence on multinational production.3
An important source of the location advantage is government policies, obvious ex-
amples being tariﬀs and investment barriers.4 In addition to these, the potential eﬀect
1See e.g. Markusen (1995, 1998).
2An early contribution on vertical multinational firms is Helpman (1984).
3See e.g. Markusen (1998).
4National policy design is the only reason for becoming multinational, for instance, in Janeba
(2000). There, investing in production capacity in two countries may be profitable if a firm wishes to
protect itself against time inconsistent governments that would otherwise confiscate all profits after
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of environmental regulation on production and location decisions of firms has received a
lot of attention. Empirical literature on how stringent environmental regulation aﬀects
the location of polluting industries is abundant but the evidence remains mixed. Most
studies reject the so-called pollution haven hypothesis which states that polluting indus-
tries leave countries with stringent environmental regulation and move to countries with
lax environmental regulation. Levinson (1996) studies location decisions of domestic
firms in the US and finds little evidence that stringent regulations deter new plants from
opening. List and Co (2000) in turn study the eﬀect of heterogenous environmental
regulations in the US states for plant location decisions of foreign multinational firms,
and conclude that stringent environmental regulation and attractiveness of location are
inversely related. Antweiler et al. (2001) study the eﬀect of reduced trade costs on the
location of polluting activities in a setting where the factor endowment motivation and
the pollution haven motivation for the location of polluting production balance one
another.5
Early theoretical studies linking environmental policy and competitiveness focus on
the eﬀects of stringent environmental regulation on the production costs of domestic
industries, see e.g. Pethig (1976) and McGuire (1982). Markusen (1997) also considers
the eﬀect of environmental regulation on the production costs of firms but studies how
the decision of national firms to remain national or become multinational is aﬀected
by strict environmental regulation. Also in Markusen et al. (1995) multinational pro-
duction may arise as a single firm must decide whether to set up a production plant
in two countries or in one country only. The trade-oﬀ for the firm is between trans-
portation costs and plant-level fixed costs. Markusen et al. analyze non-cooperative
policy design of two governments and consider two cases: 1) the firm first chooses the
location of production and the governments then choose policies and 2) policies are
chosen before location of production. They then compare welfare and pollution levels
in the two countries in these two cases.
This paper considers the role of environmental policy for multinational production
from a diﬀerent perspective. The starting point of the paper is the observation that
there has been increasing pressure towards trade liberalization through international
investment has been sunk.
5Jaﬀe et al. (1995) surveys earlier literature.
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agreements, for instance, within the WTO and its predecessor the GATT, while envi-
ronmental policy has largely remained at the discretion of national governments. We
study how this change in the international regime may influence multinational produc-
tion. We do not consider the direct eﬀects of trade agreements, like the reduction of
trade and investment barriers, which have received a lot of attention in the literature.
Instead, we study the indirect eﬀects of a trade agreement that prevents the use of ex-
port subsidies through changes in other areas of policy, namely in the design of national
environmental policies. The main questions of interest are the following: First, how
does national policy design influence firms’ incentives to invest in production capacity
in a foreign country? Second, how does the change in the international institutional
regime aﬀect the role of policy design?
In order to address this issue, we build a two country model with two polluting
firms in the spirit of the strategic trade policy literature introduced by Brander and
Spencer (1985).6 Initially each firm is established in one country, has two production
plants, and sells its product to a third market. The firms can invest abroad by closing
one plant in their home country and opening a new plant abroad. We analyze the
incentives of the firms to do that under two diﬀerent regimes. Under the first regime,
national governments may use both export subsidies and environmental policy. Under
the second regime, a trade agreement prohibits the use of export subsidies. When using
environmental policy, the national governments are constrained to set a uniform tax
rate on all polluting plants within their territory.7
Our main result is that a change in the international regime that restricts the in-
strument set available to the national governments may increase the attractiveness of
multinational production. When the governments are constrained not to use subsidies
to the domestic producer, the firms are more likely to invest abroad. The reason is that
when the governments cannot use export subsidies and the firms are national, govern-
ments use environmental policy not only to correct the negative externality caused by
production but also to shift profits to domestic shareholders. In this situation, opening
a production plant abroad aﬀects the policy of the host government in two ways. For-
6Walz and Wellisch (1997) and Tanguay (2001) use the same set-up to study the welfare eﬀects of
free trade agreements that prevent the use of export subsidies in a setting of national, immobile firms.
7This would be the case, for instance, within the EU single market.
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eign owned plants not only eliminate the possibility to use environmental policy to shift
profits to domestic shareholders but also create an incentive to tax profits accruing to
foreign shareholders. In contrast, when the governments can use both environmental
and trade policy, an investment abroad does not have similar strategic eﬀects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In sections 3 and
4 we solve the equilibrium policies and industry structure. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We develop a model of two identical countries, home and foreign, and a polluting indus-
try consisting of two firms, home (H) and foreign (F ). Each firm has two production
plants and sells its product to a third market. When the firms are national, the two
production plants of each firm are located in one country. When the firms are multi-
national, each firm has one plant in home and one in foreign country. Total output of
firm i, yi, is
yi = xi + x∗i,
where i = H,F and x is plant level production. If firm i is multinational, xi refers to
production in home country and x∗i refers to production in foreign country. Aggregate
supply is Y = yH + yF and revenue of firm i is
p (Y ) yi,
where p (Y ) is the inverse demand function in the third market. Throughout the paper
we assume that:
Assumption 1 Demand function satisfies
p00 (Y ) yi + p0 (Y ) < 0 for i = H,F .
Same abatement technology is available for the firms in both countries. We normal-
ize units of emission so that emissions generated by firm i are¡
xi − qi
¢
+
¡
x∗i − q∗i
¢
,
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where qi and q∗i are the abatement levels of firm i in its two plants. In the case
that firm i is multinational, (xi − qi) refers to emissions generated in home country
and (x∗i − q∗i) to emissions generated in foreign country. Level of emissions in home
country is denoted by E and in foreign country by E∗. Environmental damage caused
by emissions is d (E) in home country and d (E∗) in foreign country.
Trade policy takes the form of export subsidies for the domestic producer. Envi-
ronmental policy, in turn, consists of choosing emission tax levied on the firms. Each
government levies a tax on emissions generated in its own country and cannot discrim-
inate between firms according to their ownership. Tax revenues are distributed back
to consumers as lump sum transfers. We consider policy design under two diﬀerent
regimes. Under the first regime, national governments may use both trade and environ-
mental policies. Under the second regime, a trade agreement between the two countries
prevents them from using export subsidies.
Investment abroad in the form of opening a production plant in a foreign country
and closing a plant in home country must entail some cost for the investing firm. We
represent all the costs related to this investment by a fixed cost G for both firms.
Empirical evidence suggests that multinational firms exist in industries with high firm-
level fixed costs and low plant-level fixed costs. We assume that the firm-level and
plant-level fixed costs and the size of the export market are such that only two firms
exist in the market. Therefore, we consider explicitly only plant-level fixed costs. We
also assume that there are no transportation costs.8
There are four possible industry structures denoted by j ∈ {nn,mm, nm,mn},
where n denotes national and m multinational firm, and j = nm refers to the industry
structure where home firm is national and foreign firm is multinational. As all results
will be symmetric when j = nm and j = mn, we study policy design only under
industry structures j = nn, j = mm, and j = nm.
Under industry structure j, total variable costs of firm i are
Ci
¡
u; xi, x∗i, qi, q∗i; j
¢
= c
¡
xi
¢
+ c
¡
x∗i
¢
+ g
¡
qi
¢
+ g
¡
q∗i
¢
+ γi
¡
u; xi, x∗i, qi, q∗i; j
¢
(1)
8This assumption is made to simplify the analysis. We will comment on how it aﬀects the results
in section 4.2.
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where u = (t, t∗, s, s∗) is the vector of policy variables. Terms t and t∗ are the emission
tax rates in home and foreign country. Terms s and s∗ in turn are the export subsidies
for the domestic firm in home and foreign country. The first two terms in (1) denote the
cost of production in each plant. The two following terms denote the cost of emission
abatement in each plant. The last term in (1) is the total tax burden of the firm and
depends on the location of its production plants. For home firm
γH
¡
u; xH , x∗H , qH , q∗H ;nn
¢
= γH
¡
u;xH , x∗H , qH , q∗H ;nm
¢
= t
¡
xH − qH
¢
+ t
¡
x∗H − q∗H
¢
− s
¡
xH + x∗H
¢
and
γH
¡
u;xH , x∗H , qH , q∗H ;mm
¢
= γH
¡
u; xH , x∗H , qH , q∗H ;mn
¢
= t
¡
xH − qH
¢
+ t∗
¡
x∗H − q∗H
¢
− s
¡
xH + x∗H
¢
.
We will assume that:
Assumption 2 All cost functions are strictly convex, i.e. c0 (·) > 0, c00 (·) > 0,
g0 (·) > 0, g00 (·) > 0, d0 (·) > 0, and d00 (·) > 0.
We use convex production costs in order to rule out the unrealistic event that when
firms are multinational, a marginal change in environmental policy induces firms to
shift all production from one country to another.9
Timing of the events is as follows. The firms first decide whether to remain national
or to invest abroad. Investing abroad implies opening a new plant in a diﬀerent country
and closing one production plant in home country. The investment decisions of the
firms determine the industry structure. The national governments of the two countries
then choose their trade and environmental policies. Finally, after policies have been
chosen, firms decide how much to produce and abate emissions in each plant. This
timing assumption is made to capture the idea that decisions on investing in production
capacity occur less frequently than decisions on taxes and subsidies or output and
abatement.
9If the plant-level fixed cost is low, the firms would want to open production plants in their home
country or abroad due to convex production costs. Here, we want to concentrate on how national
policy design influences the firms’ strategies under the two international regimes. Therefore, we take
the number of production plants as given.
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3 Output, Abatement, and Policy Choices
In this section, we determine the output and abatement decisions of the firms and the
policy decisions of the governments under the diﬀerent industry structures. We begin
by considering the profit maximization problem of the firms and then analyze policy
design under the two regimes.
3.1 Output and Abatement Choices
Given the industry structure and the policies chosen by the national governments, the
two firms choose output and abatement levels in their two plants so as to maximize
profits. Profit of firm i is denoted by πi. Profit maximization problem of firm i is
max
xi,x∗i,qi,q∗i
©
πi = p (Y ) yi − Ci
¡
u; xi, x∗i, qi, q∗i; j
¢ª
where Ci is determined by equation (1).
Assuming interior solutions, first-order conditions for profit maximization for firm i
are10
∂πi
∂xi = p
0 (Y ) yi + p (Y )− Cixi
¡
u; xi, x∗i, qi, q∗i; j
¢
= 0, (2)
∂πi
∂x∗i = p
0 (Y ) yi + p (Y )− Cix∗i
¡
u;xi, x∗i, qi, q∗i; j
¢
= 0, (3)
∂πi
∂qi = C
i
qi
¡
u;xi, x∗i, qi, q∗i; j
¢
= 0, (4)
∂πi
∂q∗i = C
i
q∗i
¡
u; xi, x∗i, qi, q∗i; j
¢
= 0. (5)
Conditions (2) and (3) imply that profit maximizing output level in each plant is such
that marginal revenue equals marginal cost of production. Conditions (4) and (5) in
turn require that marginal abatement cost in each plant equals the emission tax rate
in the country where the plant is located.
We denote the profit maximizing output levels as a function of the policies and
industry structure by yi (u; j). Corresponding maximum profits are denoted by πi (u; j).
10Derivatives of functions of one variable are denoted by primes. Partial derivatives of functions of
several variables are denoted by subscripts.
77
From the first-order conditions for profit maximization we can derive the following
comparative statics results:
yHt (u; j) < 0 for j = nn,mm, nm,
and
yFt (u;nn) > 0, y
F
t (u;mm) < 0, and y
F
t (u;nm) < 0.
Regardless of the industry structure, stricter emission control in home country increases
the production costs of home firm. Therefore, when emission tax rate is increased in
home country, home firm reduces supply. However, the reaction of foreign firm depends
on the industry structure. When foreign firm is national, its production costs are not
aﬀected by the policy change, and foreign firm increases supply as a reaction to reduced
supply by the rival firm. When foreign firm is multinational, its production costs in
the plant that is located in home country increase. As a result, it reduces output in
the plant located in home country and increases output in the plant located in foreign
country. Its overall output declines.
In the same manner, we have that
yHs (u; j) > 0 and y
F
s (u; j) < 0 for j = nn,mm, nm.
Regardless of the industry structure, a higher export subsidy in home country reduces
the production costs of home firm and induces it to expand output. As a result, foreign
firm cuts down on supply.
3.2 Policy Design
We now turn to analyze policy design under the two international regimes. Under both
regimes, each government chooses its policies in order to maximize domestic aggregate
welfare and takes the policies chosen by the other government and the equilibrium
behavior of the firms as given.11 In order to study policies when at least one firm is
11We study only non-cooperative policy design. Because the firms have market power, the non-
cooperative policy design need not be eﬃcient. Coordination of environmental policies when polluting
firms are multinational is studied in the second essay of this dissertation.
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multinational, the ownership structure of multinational firms must be specified. For
simplicity, we assume that the ownership structure of a firm remains unchanged when
it invests abroad. Thus, when home firm opens a plant in foreign country, ownership
of the firm remains entirely in home country.
We first analyze policy design when the governments are free to use both envi-
ronmental and trade policy. We then consider a trade agreement regime where the
governments are constrained not to use export subsidies. Unless the industry structure
is asymmetric, the policy design problems of the two governments are symmetric. We
will therefore mainly focus on home government.
3.2.1 Regime of trade and environmental policy
In each country, domestic aggregate welfare consists of profits for domestic shareholders,
tax revenue net of export subsidies, and environmental damage caused by emissions.
We denote domestic aggregate welfare in home country by w and in foreign country by
w∗. Thus, home government chooses t and s so as to maximize
w (u; j) = πH (u; j) + tE (u; j)− syH (u; j)− d (E (u; j)) ,
and foreign government chooses t∗ and s∗ so as to maximize
w∗ (u; j) = πF (u; j) + t∗E∗ (u; j)− s∗yF (u; j)− d (E∗ (u; j)) ,
where E (u; j) and E∗ (u; j) are emission levels in home and foreign country.
The first-order conditions for welfare maximization for home government are
πHt (u; j) + E (u; j) + tEt (u; j)− syHt (u; j)− d0 (E (u; j))Et (u; j) = 0 (6)
and
πHs (u; j) + tEs (u; j)− syHs (u; j)− yH (u; j)− d0 (E (u; j))Es (u; j) = 0, (7)
where the first term denotes the eﬀect of a policy change on profits of the domestic
firm. The three following terms refer to changes in tax revenue net of subsidies to
the domestic firm. The last term is the welfare-eﬀect of a change in emissions. The
first-order conditions for foreign government are analogous.
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Under the assumption that the second-order conditions are satisfied, these first-order
conditions implicitly determine a unique equilibrium emission tax policy and subsidy
policy for each government. We denote these equilibrium policies under industry struc-
ture j by uj = (tj , t∗j , sj , s∗j). Results on policy design under the diﬀerent industry
structures are summarized as
Lemma 1 When the governments can freely design both trade and environmental policy
and both firms are national, each government sets the emission tax rate so that the
negative eﬀect of emissions is fully internalized and give export subsidies to the domestic
producer. When at least one firm is multinational, the government of the host country of
the investment sets an emission tax rate that exceeds the marginal damage of emissions
and gives export subsidies to the domestic firm.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Environmental policy is not an eﬃcient way of influencing the market share and
profits of the domestic firm as lowering environmental standards yields a cost in terms of
increased environmental damage. An export subsidy, in contrast, can be eﬃciently used
to enhance the competitiveness of the domestic producer. Therefore, when possible,
the governments use environmental policy to correct the negative externality caused by
production and the export subsidy to increase profits of domestic shareholders.
When one or both firms are multinational, in at least one country, there is a produc-
tion plant that is owned by foreign shareholders. The government of the host country of
this aﬃliate ignores the profits accruing to foreign shareholders when choosing policies.
As the governments cannot discriminate between the firms in terms of environmental
regulation, they set emission tax rates above the level of full internalization of environ-
mental damage and then compensate the domestic shareholders by giving an export
subsidy.
3.2.2 Trade Agreement Regime
We now turn to the trade agreement regime. The interpretation of the trade agreement
is that national governments cannot use export subsidies for domestic producers and
are thus restricted to set s = 0 and s∗ = 0. We denote the restricted policy vector bybu = (t, t∗, 0, 0).
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Under the trade agreement regime, home government chooses t so as to maximize
w (bu; j) = πH (bu; j) + tE (bu; j)− d (E (bu; j)) ,
and foreign government chooses t∗ so as to maximize
w∗ (bu; j) = πF (bu; j) + t∗E∗ (bu; j)− d (E∗ (bu; j)) ,
where E (bu; j) and E∗ (bu; j) are emission levels in home and foreign country.
The first-order condition for welfare maximization for home government is then
πHt (bu; j) + E (bu; j) + (t− d0 (E (bu; j)))Et (bu; j) = 0. (8)
First-order condition for foreign government is again analogous. Under the assump-
tion that the second-order conditions are satisfied, the first-order conditions determine
unique equilibrium tax rates, which we denote by buj = ³btj, bt∗j, 0, 0´.
As under the first regime, we are interested in policy design under the diﬀerent
industry structures given equilibrium behavior of the firms. We summarize the results
as
Lemma 2 Under the trade agreement regime, the emission tax rates are lower than
the marginal damage of emissions when both firms are national. When both firms are
multinational, tax rates in both countries exceed marginal damage. When only one firm
is multinational, tax rate exceeds marginal damage in the host country of the aﬃliate of
the multinational firm and is lower than marginal damage in the home country of the
multinational firm.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The reason for these results is twofold. First, when the firms are national, lowering
emission tax rate enhances the competitiveness of the domestic firm. This eﬀect has an
important role in policy design as profits accruing to domestic shareholders constitute
part of the domestic aggregate welfare that each government seeks to maximize. In
contrast, when the firms are multinational, relaxing environmental control induces both
firms to increase output. Therefore, changes in environmental policy do not influence
the market share of the domestic producer and consequently environmental policy is
not useful in favoring the shareholders of the domestic firm. Second, when the polluting
firms are multinational each government has an incentive to tighten pollution control
in order to tax profits accruing to foreign owners of the multinational firms.
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4 Equilibrium Industry Structure
We now determine the equilibrium industry structure. Each firm faces a decision
whether to remain national or to open a new production plant abroad. When tak-
ing this decision, the firms take into account what kind of policies will be chosen by the
governments under each industry structure and what the corresponding profits will be.
In order to able to compare profits under the diﬀerent industry structures, we assume
that
Assumption 3 Demand is p (Y ) = A − Y , where A > 0, and cost functions are
c (x) = 1
2
x2, g (q) = 1
2
q2, and d (E) = 1
2
dE2.
By these assumptions the model becomes fully parametrized and provides closed
form solutions. In order to keep the presentation clear, we locate the solutions for
optimal output and abatement levels as a function of the policies together with the
equilibrium policies in Appendix B.
The two strategies available to the firms are to invest abroad and to remain national.
We represent all costs related to opening a new plant abroad and closing one plant in
firm’s initial home country by a fixed investment cost, G. If the firms do not have a
dominant strategy, we have three Nash equilibria, two in pure strategies and one in
mixed strategies. In that case, we will concentrate on the mixed strategy equilibrium.
The mixed strategy equilibrium can be thought of as describing the tendency towards
multinationalization. When focusing on mixed strategies, it is possible to analyze in a
tractable way, how changes in the parameters of the model influence the attractiveness
of investing abroad.
In order to facilitate the discussion of the results, we define ∆n and ∆m to be the
gain in operating profits from investment under the regime of trade and environmental
policy when the rival firm is national and multinational, respectively. Thus
∆n = πH (umn;mn)− πH (unn;nn) = πF (unm;nm)− πF (unn;nn)
and
∆m = πH (umm;mm)− πH (unm;nm) = πF (umm;mm)− πF (umn;mn) .
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Under the trade agreement regime, we denote this gain by b∆n and b∆m. We analyze
the equilibrium profits and location choices of the firms first under the regime where
both environmental and trade policy can be used and then under the trade agreement
regime.
4.1 Regime of trade and environmental policy
We first determine how investing abroad influences the operating profits of the firms.
By using the equilibrium policies and corresponding supply and abatement strategies
of the firms, we can show that there exist cut-oﬀ values d and d for the environmental
damage parameter, such that the following relationships hold:
∆m < 0 for all d > 0,
∆n > 0 if d ∈
¡
d, d
¢
and
∆n < 0 if d < d and d > d.
The first inequality implies that it is never profitable to invest abroad if the rival firm is
multinational. The following two inequalities state that when the rival firm is national,
investment abroad increases operating profits under certain values for the environmental
damage parameter.
Figure 1 illustrates these relations. It shows the relative change in profits when
investing abroad when the rival firm is national and multinational. This relative change
is independent of the size of the export market, determined by parameter A in the
demand function.
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Figure 1. Relative change in profits when investing abroad under the regime of trade
and environmental policy.
If foreign firm invests in home country while home firm remains national the follow-
ing policy changes occur. First, the government of home country uses emission taxation
both to control emissions and to tax profits of foreign shareholders. When d is small,
the latter incentive dominates and investment induces a large increase in emission tax
rate. If d is higher, the relative incentive to tax foreign shareholders is less important
compared to the incentive to control emissions, and the reaction of emission tax rate to
investment is more modest. Second, home government increases the export subsidy for
the domestic firm. The increase in export subsidy due to investment is large when d is
small. This suggests that the aim of this policy change is to compensate the domestic
shareholders for the negative eﬀect of stricter emission taxation.
Lemma 3 When the governments can use both trade and environmental policy, invest-
ing abroad is never a dominant strategy.
Proof. Straightforward since ∆m < 0 for all d > 0 and A > 0.
This implies that when d /∈
¡
d, d
¢
both firms remain national regardless of the
strategy adopted by the rival firm. A necessary condition for at least one firm to invest
84
abroad is therefore d ∈
¡
d, d
¢
. However, even if investment abroad increases operating
profits, it may still be in the interest of the firms to remain national. This of course
happens if the fixed cost of investment is too high, i.e. if ∆n < G. The following
proposition characterizes the situation where there are potential gains from investing
abroad, that is, d ∈
¡
d, d
¢
and G is low enough.
Proposition 1 If ∆n > G, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where both firms
remain national with probability β. This probability is increasing in G and decreasing
in A and is always strictly larger than 1
2
.
Proof. Assume that one firm remains national with probability β. Then the rival
firm is indiﬀerent between investing abroad and remaining national if
β = ∆
m −G
∆m −∆n ,
where ∆m < 0 and ∆n > 0. Thus ∆n > G ⇒ β < 1. As the firms are symmetric
there is a mixed strategy equilibrium where the firms remain national with probability
β. The gain from investment, ∆m and ∆n, can be rewritten so that ∆m = Ae∆m and
∆n = Ae∆n where e∆m and e∆n are independent of A. Then,
∂β
∂G = −
1
∆m −∆n > 0 and
∂β
∂A =
G
³e∆m − e∆n´
(∆m −∆n)2
< 0.
It is straightforward to show that ∆n > 0 implies that |∆m| > |∆n|. Assume that
G = 0. Then
β = ∆
m
∆m −∆n >
1
2
.
It is intuitive that investing abroad is more attractive when G is small. Firms are
also more likely to invest abroad when the size of the export market, represented by
parameter A, increases. The larger the export market, the bigger the gain in operating
profits when investing abroad, which reduces the relative importance of the cost of
investment. However, even in the extreme case where G = 0, each firm is more likely
to remain national than to invest abroad.
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When the firms are national, each government uses the emission tax to correct the
negative externality generated by production and the export subsidy to increase the
profits of the domestic shareholders. Assume then that foreign firm invests in home
country. This investment induces home government to set a higher emission tax rate
in order to tax part of the profits accruing to foreign shareholders. Consequently,
profits generated by the plant that is moved from foreign country to home country
decrease compared to the situation where both plants remain in foreign country. Foreign
government in turn lowers its emission tax rate and as a result the profits generated by
the plant that remains in foreign country increase. However, when home government
tightens emission taxation it also increases the export subsidy in order to compensate
the negative eﬀect of a higher emission tax rate on the domestic firm. This mitigates
the positive eﬀect of a higher emission tax rate in home country and lower tax rate in
foreign country on the market share of foreign firm and thereby reduces the profitability
of the investment. Due to this eﬀect, in general, the increase in profits generated by
the plant that remains in foreign country is not large enough to oﬀset the costs related
to the investment.
4.2 Trade Agreement Regime
We now turn to the regime where the governments are restricted not to use trade policy.
As under the first regime we can establish the following relationships:
b∆m > 0 for all d > 0,b∆n > 0 if d > bd andb∆n < 0 if d < bd.
The first inequality implies that investment abroad always increases operating profits
when the rival firm is multinational. The following two inequalities state that when
the rival firm is national, for low values of the environmental damage parameter, d,
investment abroad lowers profits whereas for higher values it always increases profits.
As under the first regime, the size of the export market aﬀects the absolute but not the
relative change in operating profits when investing abroad. Figure 2 below shows this
relative change under the trade agreement regime.
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Figure 2. Relative change in profits when investing abroad under the trade agreement
regime.
Consider again the event that foreign firm invests in home country. Then emission
taxation in home country is partly destined to tax foreign shareholders and partly to
control emissions. When d is small, the first eﬀect is relatively more important and
investment to home country induces a large increase in tax rate. Except for very small
values of environmental damage, the investment is profitable as the domestic firm reacts
by reducing supply. When the environmental damage caused by emissions is very small
and both firms are national, the governments actually set negative emission tax rates.
In that situation investing abroad would trigger policy changes that are not favorable
to the investing firm.12
Again, it may be the case that the fixed cost of investment is high enough to deter
all investment and each firm prefers to remain national regardless of what the rival
firms does. However,
12We do not require the equilibrium emission tax rates to be non-negative. An alternative assumption
would be that zero is the lower bound for emission tax rates, as under the trade agreement regime
negative emission tax rates could well be prohibited. This assumption would make remaining national
less profitable under the trade agreement regime.
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Lemma 4 When the governments can use only environmental policy and d > bd, in-
vesting abroad is a dominant strategy for both firms if the fixed cost of investment is
low enough.
Proof. Straightforward, since d > bd implies that b∆n > 0 for all A > 0. Sinceb∆m > 0 for all d > 0 and A > 0, there exist values of G > 0 such that b∆n > G andb∆m > G.
When both firms are national, the governments use environmental policy not only
to correct the negative externality caused by production but also to achieve trade policy
goals. By Lemma 2, emission tax rates in both countries are lower than the marginal
damage caused by emissions. Assume that in this situation foreign firm invests in home
country. As a result, the national governments of the two countries will choose diﬀerent
emission tax policies. In particular, home government will set a tax rate that exceeds
the marginal damage of emissions whereas the tax rate set by foreign government will be
lower than the marginal damage of emissions. There are two reasons for this. First, in
choosing its policy, home government ignores profits accruing to foreign shareholders.
Second, from the point of view of home government, relaxing environmental policy
is no longer useful in shifting profits to the domestic firm as adopting a more lax
environmental policy induces foreign firm to expand supply. For foreign firm the motive
to invest abroad is purely strategic: the profits generated by the plant that is moved to
home country decrease. However, by investing in home country foreign firm is able to
influence the policy choices of home government and thus supply decisions of home firm
in a way that leads to increased profits generated by the plant that remains in foreign
country. Figure 2 shows that except for very low values of the environmental damage
parameter this positive eﬀect dominates.
We are now able to compare the incentives of the firms to invest abroad under the
two regimes. The previous discussion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Emergence of multinational firms is more likely when the governments
are constrained not to use direct trade policy measures.
Proof. By using b∆n, b∆m, and ∆n derived in Appendix C we can show that
b∆n > ∆n and b∆m > ∆n for all A > 0 and d > 0.
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Therefore,
∆n > G =⇒ b∆n > G and b∆m > G.
The gain in operating profits when investing abroad is always higher under the
trade agreement regime than under the regime of both environmental and trade policy.
Therefore, if the firms remain national with probability β ∈
¡
1
2
, 1
¢
under the regime of
both environmental and trade policy, they have a dominant strategy to invest abroad
under the trade agreement regime. Therefore, under a certain parameter range, signing
an agreement that leads to the trade agreement regime, increases the probability that
polluting firms invest abroad.
Here, investment flows are between home and foreign country while the consumers
are located in the third country. Consequently, adding strictly positive transportation
costs would not aﬀect the firms’ incentives to invest abroad. If, instead, the product
of the firms was consumed in home and foreign country, transportation costs could be
avoided by investing abroad. In that situation, an increase in transportation costs would
clearly increase the attractiveness of investing abroad. However, if the transportation
costs do not depend on the international institutional setting, they would aﬀect the
incentives to invest abroad in the same way under the two regimes. Therefore, if the
transportation costs are very high and the fixed cost of investment suﬃciently low, the
firms may invest abroad regardless of the government policies in a setting of domestic
consumption.
What is crucial for Proposition 2 is the diﬀerent nature of the two instruments avail-
able for the national governments. The governments cannot diﬀerentiate the treatment
of emissions generated by production plants according to their ownership. Therefore,
environmental policy cannot be used to discriminate between the firms when they are
multinational. In contrast, export subsidies can be eﬃciently targeted to the domestic
firm. This means that the relationship of each government and the domestic firm de-
pends on the international regime. When the government cannot use trade policy to
protect the domestic firm, it will use an instrument that attracts investment from the
foreign firm.
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5 Conclusions
We have studied the influence of international trade agreements on the location strate-
gies of polluting firms. Our focus has been on the indirect eﬀects of these agreements
through changes in the design of national environmental policies. Our main result is
that a change in the international regime that restricts the instrument set available to
the national governments may lead to multinationalization of production.
Under the trade agreement regime, firms invest abroad because they want to influ-
ence the policy decisions of the other government and output decisions of the rival firm.
When the firms are national, governments use environmental policy not only to correct
the negative externality caused by production but also to shift profits to the domestic
shareholders. In this situation, foreign owned plants not only eliminate the possibility
to use lax environmental policy to trade related goals but also create an incentive to
tax profits accruing to foreign shareholders. This induces the government to tighten
emission control which in turn leads to lower market share for the domestic producer.
In contrast, when the governments may use both environmental and trade policy,
investment abroad does not have the same strategic eﬀect. When both firms are na-
tional, emission tax rates equal the marginal damage caused by emissions and firms
receive export subsidies. The fact that the governments have two instruments at their
disposal and can use export subsidies to discriminate between the firms, makes invest-
ment abroad less attractive for the firms. If the foreign firm invests in home country,
home government raises the emission tax rate above the marginal damage of emissions
in order to capture part of the profits accruing to the foreign shareholders. However, at
the same time it also raises the export subsidy to the domestic firm so as to compensate
the domestic shareholders for the negative eﬀects of stricter emission taxation. This
makes investment abroad less profitable.
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A Appendix
For the sake of notational clarity, we define zH,u (u; j) and zF,u (u; j) to be the price
eﬀect of a change in policy variable u ∈ {t, t∗, s, s∗} on the profit of home and foreign
firm, respectively, under industry structure j. Then
zH,u (u; j) = p0 (Y (u; j)) yFu (u; j) y
H (u; j) ,
zF,u (u; j) = p0 (Y (u; j)) yHu (u; j) y
F (u; j) .
Proof of Lemma 1. When the firms are national, equations (6) and (7) become
zH,t − snnyHt + (tnn − d0 (E))Et = 0 (A1)
and
zH,s − snnyHs + (tnn − d0 (E))Es = 0, (A2)
where all functions and partial derivatives are evaluated at (unn;nn). As zH,t (unn;nn) =
−zH,s (unn;nn) and yHt (unn;nn) = −yHs (unn;nn), it follows that tnn = d0 (E) and
snn > 0.
When both firms have one production plant in each country, (6) and (7) become
zH,t − smmyHt + (tmm − d0 (E))Et +
¡
xF − tmm
¢
= 0 (A3)
and
zH,s − smmyHs + (tmm − d0 (E))Es = 0, (A4)
where all functions and derivatives are evaluated at (umm;mm). Solving (A4) for smm
and plugging into (A3) gives
zH,tyHs − (tmm − d0 (E))
¡
Esy
H
t − EtyHs
¢
− zH,syHt +
¡
xF − tmm
¢
yHs = 0.
Solving for (tmm − d0 (E)) yields
(tmm − d0 (E)) =
zH,tyHs − zH,syHt +
¡
xF − tmm
¢
yHs
EsyHt − EtyHs
.
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The nominator is positive since zH,t (u;mm) > 0 and zH,s (u;mm) > 0 and yHs (u;mm) >
0 and yHt (u;mm) < 0. The denominator is also positive since
¯¯
yHt (u;mm)
¯¯
<
¯¯
yHs (u;mm)
¯¯
and |Es (u;mm)| < |Et (u;mm)|. Since (tmm − d0 (E (u;mm))) > 0 it directly follows
from (A4) that smm > 0.
Finally, when foreign firm is multinational and home firm is national, (6) and (7)
become
zH,t − snmyHt + (tnm − d0 (E))Et +
¡
xF − tnm
¢
= 0 (A5)
and
zH,s − snmyHs + (tnm − d0 (E))Es = 0, (A6)
where all functions and derivatives are evaluated at (unm;nm). From profit maximiza-
tion it follows that yHt (u;nm) < 0, y
H
s (u;nm) > 0, y
F
t (u;nm) < 0, y
F
s (u;nm) < 0.
Hence, zH,t (u;nm) > 0, zH,s (u;nm) > 0. Solving (A6) for snm and plugging into (A5),
it can be rewritten as
(tnm − d0 (E)) =
zH,tyHs − zH,syHt +
¡
xF − tnm
¢
yHs
yHs y
H
t
³
Es
yHs
− Et
yHt
´ ,
where the RHS is positive since
³
Es
yHs
− Et
yHt
´
< 0 as
Et
yHt
=
xHt − qHt + x∗Ht − q∗Ht + xFt − qFt
xHt + x
∗H
t
> 1 and
0 <
Es
yHs
=
xHs + x
∗H
s + x
F
s
xHs + x
∗H
s
< 1.
Since (tnm − d0 (E)) > 0 it follows that snm > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. When the firms are national, (8) becomes
zH,t (bu;nn) + ¡btnn − d0 (E (bu;nn))¢Et (bu;nn) = 0. (A7)
Since zH,t (bu;nn) < 0 and Et (bu;nn) < 0 it directly follows that btnn < d0 (E (bu;nn)).
When the firms are multinational, (8) becomes
zH,t (bu;mm) + ¡btmm − d0 (E (bu;mm))¢Et (bu;mm) + ¡xF (bu;mm)− btmm¢ = 0. (A8)
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As zH,t (bu;mm) > 0, ¡xF (bu;mm)− btmm¢ > 0 and Et (bu;mm) < 0 we have that btmm >
d0 (E (bu;mm)).
Finally, when foreign firm is multinational and home firm is national, the first-order
conditions of the governments are
zH,t (bu;nm) + ¡btnm − d0 (E (bu;nm))¢Et (bu;nm) + ¡xF (bu;nm)− btnm¢ = 0 (A9)
and
zF,t
∗
(bu;nm) + ³bt∗nm − d0 (E∗ (bu;nm))´E∗t∗ (bu;nm) = 0. (A10)
Again Et (bu;nm) < 0 and E∗t∗ (bu;nm) < 0. Since zH,t (bu;nm) > 0 and zF,t∗ (bu;nm) < 0,
we have that btnm > d0 (E (bu;nm)) and bt∗nm < d0 (E∗ (bu;nm)).
B Equilibrium output, abatement, and policies un-
der Assumption 3
Under Assumption 3, using first-order conditions (2)-(5) and the corresponding first-
order conditions of foreign firm yields
xH (u;nn) = x∗H (u;nn) =
1
7
A+
5
21s−
5
21t+
2
21t
∗ − 2
21s
∗, (B1)
xF (u;nn) = x∗F (u;nn) =
1
7
A+
5
21s
∗ − 5
21t
∗ +
2
21t−
2
21s, (B2)
E (u;nn) =
2
7
A+
10
21s−
52
21t−
4
21s
∗ +
4
21t
∗, (B3)
E∗ (u;nn) =
2
7
A+
10
21s
∗ − 52
21τ −
4
21s+
4
21t, (B4)
and profits for home firm are
πH (u;nn) = 5
2
¡
xH (u;nn)2 + x∗H (u;nn)2
¢
+ t2. (B5)
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In the same manner when j = mm,
xH (u;mm) =
1
7
A+
5
21s−
4
7
t− 2
21s
∗ +
3
7
t∗, (B6)
xF (u;mm) =
1
7
A+
5
21s
∗ − 4
7
t− 2
21s+
3
7
t∗, (B7)
x∗H (u;mm) =
1
7
A+
5
21s−
4
7
t∗ − 2
21s
∗ +
3
7
t, (B8)
x∗F (u;mm) =
1
7
A+
5
21s
∗ − 4
7
t∗ − 2
21s+
3
7
t, (B9)
E (u;mm) =
2
7
A− 22
7
t+
6
7
t∗ +
3
21s+
3
21s
∗, (B10)
E∗ (u;mm) =
2
7
A+
6
7
t− 22
7
t∗ +
3
21s+
3
21s
∗, (B11)
and profits for home firm are
πH (u;mm) =
µ
3
2
xH (u;mm) + x∗H (u;mm)
¶
xH (u;mm) +
1
2
t2 + (B12)µ
3
2
x∗H (u;mm) + xH (u;mm)
¶
x∗H (u;mm) +
1
2
t∗2.
Finally, when j = nm,
xH (u;nm) = x∗H (u;nm) =
1
7
A− 4
21t+
1
21t
∗ − 2
21s
∗ +
5
21s, (B13)
xF (u;nm) =
1
7
A− 11
21t+
8
21t
∗ +
5
21s
∗ − 2
21s, (B14)
x∗F (u;nm) =
1
7
A+
10
21t−
13
21t
∗ +
5
21s
∗ − 2
21s, (B15)
E (u;nm) =
3
7
A− 82
21t+
10
21t
∗ +
1
21s
∗ +
8
21s, (B16)
E∗ (u;nm) =
1
7
A+
10
21t−
34
21t
∗ +
5
21s
∗ − 2
21s, (B17)
and profits for home and foreign firm are
πH (u;nm) = 5
2
¡
xH (u;nm)2 + x∗H (u;nm)2
¢
+ t2. (B18)
and
πF (u;nm) =
µ
3
2
xF (u;nm) + x∗F (u;nm)
¶
xF (u;nm) +
1
2
t2 + (B19)µ
3
2
x∗F (u;nm) + xF (u;nm)
¶
x∗F (u;nm) +
1
2
t∗2.
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B.1 Regime of trade and environmental policy
By plugging (B1)-(B4) into equations (A1), (A2) and the corresponding first-order
conditions for foreign government, we have that
tnn = t∗nn = 10d A
72d+ 31 , (B20)
snn = s∗nn = 4 (2d+ 1) A
72d+ 31 . (B21)
Similarly, plugging (B6)-(B11) into equations (A3) and (A4) yields
tmm = t∗mm =
1
6
A
31d+ 7
37d+ 22
, (B22)
smm = s∗mm =
1
12A
52d+ 37
37d+ 22
. (B23)
Finally, plugging (B13)-(B17)) into equations (A5)-(A6) gives
t∗nm =
Ad (282d+ 79)
2040d2 + 2002d+ 445
, (B24)
tnm =
1
4
A (1144d2 + 774d+ 77)
2040d2 + 2002d+ 445
, (B25)
snm =
A (256d2 + 274d+ 73)
2040d2 + 2002d+ 445
, (B26)
s∗nm =
1
2
A (448d2 + 486d+ 111)
2040d2 + 2002d+ 445
. (B27)
B.2 Trade Agreement Regime
Given that s = 0 and s∗ = 0 by plugging (B1)-(B4) into equation (A7) and the corre-
sponding first-order condition for foreign government, we have that
btnn = bt∗nn = 2A 13d− 1
208d+ 89
. (B28)
Similarly, plugging (B6)-(B11) into (A8) gives
btmm = bt∗mm = 1
4
A
44d+ 9
88d+ 53
. (B29)
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Finally, plugging (B13)-(B17)) into (A9) and (A10) yields
bt∗nm = 1
2
A
4506d+ 22304d2 − 683
20127 + 88702d+ 89216d2 (B30)
and
btnm = A 2 (5576d2 + 3612d+ 277)
20127 + 88702d+ 89216d2 . (B31)
C Appendix
Under the regime of trade and environmental policy, gain from investment when the
rival firm is multinational is
∆m = πH (umm;mm)− πH (unm;nm) ,
where πH (umm;mm) follows from (B12) using (B6)-(B9), (B22), and (B23). Similarly,
πH (unm;nm) follows from (B18) using (B13)-(B15) and (B24)-(B27). Straightforward
calculations show that ∆m < 0 for all d > 0.
Gain from investment when the rival is national is
∆n = πH (umn;mn)− πH (unn;nn)
where πH (umn;mn) = πF (unm;nm) follows from (B19) using equations (B13)-(B15)
and (B24)-(B27). In the same manner, πH (unn;nn) follows from (B5) using equations
(B1), (B2), (B20), and (B21). Straightforward calculations show that ∆n = 0 when
d = d ≈ 0.30 and d = d ≈ 1.12. Furthermore, ∆n > 0 when d ∈
¡
d, d
¢
and ∆n < 0
when d /∈
¡
d, d
¢
.
Under the trade agreement regime, gain from investment when the rival firm is
national is
b∆n = πH (bumn;mn)− πH (bunn;nn)
where πH (bunn;nn) is follows from (B5) using (B1), (B2) and (B28) and πH (bumn;mn) =
πF (bunm;nm) from (B19) using equations (B13)-(B15), and (B30) and (B31). We have
that b∆n = 0 when d = bd ≈ 0.05 and that b∆n > 0 for all d > bd.
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Finally, gain from investment when the rival is multinational is
b∆m = πH (bumm;mm)− πH (bunm;nm)
where πH (bumm;mm) follows from (B12) using (B6)-(B9), and (B29), and πH (bunm;nm)
from (B18) using (B13)-(B17), (B30), and (B31). It is again straightforward to show
that b∆m > 0 for all d > 0.
Using the above expressions, we have that for all d > 0 and A > 0
b∆n −∆n > 0 and b∆m −∆n > 0.
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